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Introduction 
 
There is an intense debate in the development community over the causes of inequality in 
 
the international society. One side, espoused by Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel, argues 
that geography is the prime factor that explains international inequality
1
. Such arguments focus 
on the barriers to political and economic development posed by inherent geographic features of a 
land like the amount of arable land, access to water sources, climate, and disease vulnerability. 
The other side, embodied by Daren Acemoglu’s and James Robinson’s Why Nation’s Fail argues 
that political institutions are the prime factors that explain international inequality
2
. Such 
arguments focus on the effects of political institutions on economic outcomes like lack of public 
good procurement, extractive regimes, market manipulation, and corruption. This paper theorizes 
that the cause of international inequality is not one or the other, but rather a combination of both, 
where the main causal factor is whether or whether not the political institutions of a society are 
adapted to the geography the society inhabits. Geography determines the original social structure 
of society, which effects the political institutions of that society. 
 
Societies with access to arable land whether through access to rivers for irrigation or 
sufficient rainfall utilized intensive agriculture in order to adapt to the environment. Intensive 
agriculture has little risk due to either a steady climate or a stable water source, and high 
rewards, so personalizing the risk and rewards results in optimal production
3
. The state of nature 
in these societies resembles the prisoner’s dilemma described by Hobbes and Locke, where 
individuals always have the incentive to defect in order to steal other’s produce, rather than 
cooperating by respecting each other’s property. Therefore a social contract is needed to create a 
centralized state that will enforce these private property rights, and provide the necessary 
collective public goods to make private property economically viable. Modern Western political 
thought is based off Hobbes and Locke’s original conception of the state of nature, and their 
proscriptions on the type of institutions that best solve this state of nature. Hobbes introduced the 
conception of the modern centralized state composed of individuals and a sovereign, where only 
the power of the state to protect individuals from the state of nature determined its borders and 
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Diamond, Jared M. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies. New York: Norton, 1997. 
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ed. New York: Crown, 2012 
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Bates, Daniel G. Human Adaptive Strategies: Ecology, Culture, and Politics. Needham Heights: Allyn & Bacon, 
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limits, rather than tradition or collective identity. Locke extended this protection to all 
individual’s property, and developed a government composed of elected representatives charged 
with protecting these rights by making laws. These institutions are created to allow individuals 
to compete for resources for optimal collective gain, rather than cooperate. 
 
In geographic areas with less arable land the indigenous people will develop a tribal 
social structure focused on a collective identity, rather than individual identity in order to adapt 
to the environment. Terrain like deserts, mountains, steppes, and rain forests are agriculturally 
inhospitable due to climate, soil content, or difficulty of clearing sufficient land. Populations are 
concentrated into either small valley or oasis villages in practicing sedentary horticulture, or 
spread out along the desert or mountainside as mobile pastoralists. Both procurement systems 
tend towards tribal social organizations
4
. These communities are subject to greater fluctuations in 
the environment and climate, so they develop collective identities in order to pool risks, rather 
than personalize risk like in individualistic societies. Their state of nature resembles the stag hunt 
game described by Rousseau, where the overriding incentive is to cooperate, but due to lack of 
trust or communication an individual may defect. Therefore they create tribal collectivist 
institutions that are designed for cooperation among individuals for collective gain. 
 
Effective political institutions, where effective is defined as providing for general well-
being, are seen as legitimate, provide for property rights, are accountable to the people, and 
follow the rule of law. Western individualist societies base legitimacy on artificial boundaries 
that collect individuals within a geographic area, while tribal collectivist base legitimacy on a 
collective identity from a common lineage. Western individualist societies prefer private 
property when risk is low to maximize individual incentives, while tribal collectivist societies 
prefer collective property rights in order to minimize risk. Western individualist societies prefer 
factional representative government based on competing interests, while tribal collectivist 
societies prefer consensus based on collective interest. Western individualist societies prefer 
retributive justice in order to deter, while tribal collectivist societies prefer restorative justice in 
order to repair trust. When a society imposes its political institutions on another with a different 
underlying geography and social structure, it imposes political institutions ill adapted to that 
society and by result ineffective. This paper will focus on how Western individualistic political 
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6 
 
institutions are ineffective at providing development for tribal collectivist societies, and seek to 
identify effective political institutions for tribal collectivist societies through an empirical study 
of Native American tribal governments. . 
 
The empirical study takes a random geographically stratified sample of 70 out of the 337 
 
federally recognized Native American tribes in the contiguous 48 states of the United States of 
America. From this random sample it codes a series of institutional designs and characteristics as 
independent variables, and collects series of well-being indicators as dependent variables from 
each tribe. These well-being indicators are combined into a Tribal Development Index modeled 
of the United Nations Human Development Index and the Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index. 
The study seeks to isolate the institutional designs that are effective and ineffective at providing 
development to tribes through a series of linear regressions and t-tests. The paper predicts that 
the most effective institutions relate closer to tribal traditions and collective identities, rather than 
Western notions of legalism and individualism. 
 
Why Native Americans? 
 
Native Americans pertain to this question of effective political institutions for tribal 
 
collectivism in four key areas: geography, history, politics, and development. Geographically 
 
Native American Tribes are spread throughout the continental United States, but are primarily 
concentrated in the West with over 75% of Native Americans living in states west of the 
Mississippi River
5
. This is an important geographic distinction because all lands west of the 100
th 
meridian of the Continental United States require extensive irrigation for agriculture. Those 
tribes who remain in the East live in geographically isolated locations like the Seminole in the 
Florida Everglades, and the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians in Northern Minnesota. This is 
the product of history as Native American tribes were driven off their land due to endemics, 
wars, and white settler intrusion starting in the 17
th 
century and not ending until the close of the 
19
th
. The Dawes Act, which will be further described in the paper, also served to take millions of 
the best acres of arable land away from Native America tribes
6
. Thus Native American tribes are 
similar to tribal people all across the world in being located in geographically inhospitable and 
isolated areas. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
5 
Norris, Tina, Paula L. Vines, and Elizabeth M. Hoeffel . “American Indian and Alaska Native Population.” United 
States. Census Bureau.: 2012. Web. 
6 
O'Brien, Sharon. American Indian Tribal Governments. Vol. 192. University of Oklahoma Press, 1999 
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Historically Native American tribes have all gone through repeated attempts by the 
United States Federal Government to raise Native American prosperity through imposing 
Western individualistic institutions on them. First came the Dawes Act of 1887, which sought to 
impose private property rights on the tribes and break down tribal social structures into 
individualistic household structures. Next came the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, 
which overturned the Dawes Act, but sought to impose Western political institutions on the tribe. 
The 1950s saw a termination policy, which sought to end tribes’ special ties to the federal 
government and encourage Native Americans to move to cities. The Great Society policies of 
the 1960s extended social welfare to the tribes and paternalistic economic development schemes 
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Finally after a series of violent Native American protests 
in the 1970s, Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s, and a new federal policy of self-
determination, tribes were given control over their own destinies both politically and 
economically
7
. Thus Native Americans experienced problems of exploitation, political 
imposition, urbanization, and paternalism, which are shared commonly by tribal populations 
today in the developing world. 
 
The politics of Native American tribes is an interesting and fruitful area of study. 
 
The IRA imposed western institutions on existing tribes and established new tribal entities where 
they did not exist before. Some tribes resisted the IRA and established their own constitutions or 
maintained their traditional institutions. Therefore there is a variety of political institutions to 
analyze. Also their relationship and status as sovereign elements within westernized states is 
interesting. Tribal societies coexist with settler societies in developing countries. In fact they 
depend on each other economically and socially. Pastoralists need agriculturalists and urbanites 
to sell their products to and to buy foodstuffs and manufactured goods from. Nomadic traders 
depend on settled communities to ply their trade. Native Americans interact both economically 
and socially with the surrounding American population, whether it be Americans going to tribal 
casinos, or tribesmen going to universities in urban centers. This economic relationship will be 
further explored in the property rights section of the paper. The paper seeks to identify 
institutions that not only effectively govern tribal collectivist societies, but are able to coexist 
with settlers as well. 
                                                                                                                  
7 
Cornell, Stephen, and Joseph P. Kalt. “Pathways from poverty: Economic Development and Institution-Building 
on American Indian Reservations.” American Indian Culture and Research Journal 14, no. 1 (1990): 89-125
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Finally the wide disparity in development outcomes among tribes points to a causal 
factor. Historical Native Americans have been the poorest minority in American society. In 
1928, the Native American population suffered from disease, malnutrition, poverty and 
discontent. Life expectancy was only 44 years and average annual per capita income was only 
one hundred dollars.
8 
Years of failed federal policies did not drastically improve the situation. By 
1980 the census 45 percent of reservation Native Americans lived under the poverty line ($4,190 
individual income). Housing quality was poor with “21 percent of reservation Indian households 
had no indoor toilet facilities; 16 percent lacked electricity; 54 percent had no central heating.”9 
After the switch to self-determination policies Native American prosperity increased. By 2010 
the reservation Native American poverty rate decreased to 29.4 percent
10
. Among all Native 
Americans only 2.6 percent are without plumbing facilities and 10 percent are without have 
central heating
11
. Yet this increase was not uniform across the tribes with some becoming more 
wealthy than the surrounding American population and others being mired in the same 
destitution. For example the Pala Band of Luiseño Mission Indians of the Pala Reservation in 
California have a median income of $102,292 and poverty rate of 15%, while the White 
Mountain Apache Tribe of the Fort Apache Reservation has a median income of $26,582 and a 
poverty rate of 44%
12
. This paper will seek to explain this disparity in outcomes based on the 
political institutions of each tribe. 
 
Why Do Tribes Matter? 
 
 Improving governance and development outcomes in countries with predominantly tribal 
collectivist societies is important from both a development and national security perspective. Countries 
with high levels of tribalism are the least developed countries in the world. The 
Tribalism Index composed by The University of South Florida affiliated nonprofit think-tank The 
Citizenship Initiative measures tribalism through compiling multiple indicators and indexes on 
corruption, ethnic fractionalization, gender inequality, group grievance, and indigenous population  
                                                                                                          
8 
See 6 
9 
See 7 
10 
Champagne, Dwayne. “Breaking the Cycle of Poverty and Crime in Indian Country”. Indian Country Today 
Media Network, October 19, 2013. Read more at http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/10/06/breaking-
cycle-poverty-and-crime-indian-country-151430 
11 
U.S. Census Bureau; American Indian Alone Housing Characteristics: 2006-2010 American Community Survey 
5-Year Estimates 
12 
U.S. Census Bureau; American Indian Alone Economic Characteristics: 2006-2010 American Community Survey 
5-Year Estimates 
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from 2011
13
. Figure 1 shows a 
scatterplot with the Tribalism 
Index as the independent 
variable on the x -axis and 
GDP per capita as the 
dependent variable on a logged 
y-axis shows a strong negative 
relationship between tribalism 
and GDP per capita
14
. 
Therefore from a development 
perspective finding a 
governance solution for 
countries with high levels of 
tribalism will have a large 
effect on alleviating poverty in 
the developing world. In addition to poverty, tribal societies are magnets for terrorists, criminal 
networks, and rebel groups. Such groups are naturally drawn to areas of geographic isolation, weak 
governance, history of corruption and violence, and poverty in order to escape central authorities and 
engrain themselves inside of a local tribe through marriages and kin relationships
15
. Multiple fronts in 
the War on Terror in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Mali, Afghanistan, and Iraq are in areas of tribal 
societies. Solving tribal governance issues would prevent national security threats from obtaining safe 
havens. 
 
 
Paper Outline 
 
Moving forward, this paper will first describe the main dependent variable for all 
 
empirical statistical tests: the State Controlled Tribal Development Index Score. This chapter will 
show how the score is computed and give descriptive details on the distribution of the scores 
across the tribes under study. Next the paper will describe the independent variables that seek to 
explain the differences in state controlled Tribal Development Scores. Each independent variable  
                                                                              
13 Jacobson, David & Deckard, Natalie.” The Tribalism Index: Unlocking the Relationship Between Tribal Patriarchy and 
Islamist Militants”. New Global Studies. (2012) Volume 6, Issue 1 
14 The World Bank; World Development Indicators: GDP per Capita 2011 
Figure 1 Relationship between Tribalism Index and GDP per Capita 
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corresponds to the previously mentioned keys to effective governance: legitimacy, property 
rights, accountability, and rule of law. Descriptions of each variable will be followed by 
descriptive statistics illustrating the distribution of independent variables among the tribes under 
study. Then the paper will examine and analyze the results of the statistical tests for each group 
of independent variables. Finally a conclusion will summarize the paper’s findings and propose a 
new model for thinking about governance in the developing world based on the constitutional 
tribe. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
This paper finds that institutional designs adapted to collectivist tribal societies 
 
outperform institutional designs adapted for individualistic settler societies in producing overall 
tribal development. Such collectivist tribal institutional designs are hybrid traditional and legal 
constitutions (legitimacy), common pool resource institutions (property rights), legislative 
elections by the entire tribe (accountability), executive elections by popular vote (accountability), 
tribal police provision (rule of law), and traditional court systems (rule of law). The 
individualistic settler institutional designs are IRA imposed constitutions (legitimacy), private or 
centralized property rights (property rights), legislative elections by district (accountability), 
executive elections by tribal council (accountability), outside police provision (rule of law), and 
formal tribal court structures (rule of law) respectively.
11 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
 
Composition and Selection of the Random Sample 
 
The random sample is composed of 70 federally recognized tribes from 27 different 
 
states within the continental US
16
. The sample is geographically stratified to get a representative 
sample of the entire Native American population of the US excluding Alaska and Hawaii. Since 
the size of tribes vary greatly from just 100 members to over 100,000 a random sample of just 
tribal entities could cause a bias towards states with many small tribes over states with a few big 
tribes. For example California has 114 tribal entities, 34% of tribal entities, but only represents 
15% of the population of Native Americans in the United States, while Arizona has only 20 
tribal entities, 5% of tribal entities, but represents 13% of the Native American population. 
Therefore the stratified random selection allots each state a portion of the random sample based 
on its portion of the total Native American population in the United States as determined by the 
2010 census. That portion is then randomly selected from the tribal entities within that state. For 
example 5% of Native Americans live Washington State, so Washington State gets an allotment 
of 4 tribal entities to the random sample. From the 28 tribes in Washington State, 4 are selected 
by a random number generator
17
. 
 
Tribes randomly chosen were disqualified from the data set if they did not meet a 
minimum population threshold of 350 members, which excluded them from census surveys. The 
Navajo Nation was excluded from the data set due to its large size of over 150,000 members, 
which made its political institutions fundamentally different from the rest of the tribal entities of 
the random sample who averaged 5,500 members. If they were chosen, but disqualified, than 
another random selection would be made from the state’s tribal entities with the disqualified tribe 
being excluded from the list. If a state did not have enough qualified federally recognized tribes 
to fill its allotment then a state with less than 1% of the Native American population would be 
given the allotment. Tribes whose boundaries occupied multiple states would be classified by the 
state which it had the greatest portion of its territory in. 
 
                                                                          
 16 See Appendix A for list of tribes 
17 
Random number generator used from www.random.org
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Statistically Defining the Population 
 
The study primarily utilizes US Census data from the 2010 ACS 5-year American Indian 
 
and Alaska Native Tables Economic Characteristics, Housing Characteristics, and Social 
Characteristics data sets. The American Community Survey (ACs) is a nationwide survey that 
“produces demographic, social, housing and economic statistics in the form of 1-year, 3-year and 
5-year estimates based on population thresholds
18”. Its strengths lie in “percents, means, 
medians, and rates rather than estimates of population totals.
19” In order to isolate a tribe’s data 
the study utilizes the US Census’s racial and ethnic group categorizations for each tribe. The US 
census utilizes self-identification to determine race. Race designations can appear as either “racial 
group” alone or “racial group” alone or in combination. The former means that the survey 
respondent referred to themselves as only of this racial category, while the latter means they 
referred to themselves as a combination of one or more racial groups. The study will utilize the 
data for “racial group” alone when the tribal membership blood quantum membership is above ½ 
and will utilize data for “racial group” alone or combination if it is below ½. Blood quantum 
refers to the racial grouping of one’s parents, i.e if one parent is fully Native American and the 
other parent is ½ Native American, than the child would be ¾ Native American. 
 
Why use racial grouping of tribes instead of geographic grouping within reservations? 
The purpose of the study is not to identify the tribe that has the strongest reservation economy, 
but rather to find the tribes with the greatest overall welfare inside and outside of the reservation. 
If the tribal model is to be adapted overseas, than it cannot be assumed that the tribal government 
should only serve those who remain in the homeland or reservation, rather the tribe should 
benefit the diaspora urban population as well. This could be done through providing scholarships 
to universities, social networks, or periodic cultural ceremonies for the diaspora to return and 
attend to. The best tribal governments serve all of those who self-identify with the tribe, rather 
than just those who live within its reservation boundaries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
18
US Census Bureau. American Community Survey. About the Data.. Web. 30 Mar 2014. 
<http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/affhelp/jsf/pages/metadata.xhtml?lang=en&type=program&id=program.en.ACS 
19
See 18 
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Building the State-Controlled Tribal Development Index 
 
The Tribal Development Index is designed to be a holistic index that seeks to capture the 
 
general welfare of the tribe on a multi-dimensional level. The model is composed of indicators 
similar to the UN Human Development Index (economic and capability) and the Multi-
Dimensional Poverty Index (Living Standards) with the addition of measurements for family 
welfare and classic economic indicators like the unemployment rate, poverty rate, and a Gini 
coefficient estimate. The score it creates is a number between 0 and 1 that captures both the 
ranking of tribes and the magnitude of differences between them. The final score is controlled by 
the surrounding state score in order to eliminate the bias of surrounding wealth. Figure 2 visually 
depicts the model: 
 
Economic Indicators 
 
 
The economic category is divided into three sub-categories: wealth, employment, and 
 
inequality. These measurements are intended to give an overall picture of the individual and 
 
tribal command of resources, the economic vibrancy of the tribe, and the distribution of wealth 
within the tribe.
Figure 2 Tribal Development Index Model 
14 
 
The wealth sub-category is composed of median income and mean income. Both 
measurements are from the US Census 2010 ACS 5-year American Indian and Alaska Native 
Tables on Economic Characteristics. The study utilizes the household median income to 
determine what the average tribal member’s purchasing power is. The higher the purchasing 
power, the greater the quantity and quality of a basket of goods and services a household may 
command. The household mean income serves as a proxy for the common use of GDP per capita 
used in developmental economics. The measure takes the entirety of tribal income and divides it 
by the number of tribe members. This number indicates the total resources the tribe controls, 
which differs from the median measurement that measures an individual household’s command 
over resources. 
 
The employment sub-category utilizes the unemployment rate to determine the vibrancy 
of the tribal economy. The unemployment rate is determined by dividing the number 
unemployed people by the civilian workforce, where the latter is defined as all of people looking 
for work. A vibrant economy utilizes all necessary resources including labor, so a high 
unemployment rate means an economy is not running at its full potential. In the case of Native 
American tribes an economy dependent on federal benefits will show a high unemployment rate, 
but a decent poverty rate and income. The purpose of this study is to identify tribes with an 
independent and sustainable economy that reduces poverty rather than one dependent on the 
 
 
Figure 3 Gini Coefficient Estimate  
Comanche Nation Example 
federal government. The unemployment rate data is 
taken directly from the US Census 2010 ACS 5- 
year American Indian and Alaska Native Tables 
 
on Economic Characteristics. 
 
 
The inequality sub-category utilizes a 
Gini coefficient estimate and poverty rate to 
determine the distribution of income within the 
tribe. Inequality is a big issue in developing 
countries, where elites control political and 
economic institutions, while the rest remain 
impoverished. This is especially important when 
considering the resource curse. Tribal casinos are
15 
 
 
similar to natural resource endowments: large sources of concentrated income that requires a low 
percentage of the labor force. Therefore it is critical to the study to insure the resources of the 
tribe are used to increase the plight of the lowest social strata. The Gini coefficient estimate is 
calculated by first taking the income distribution data from the US Census 2010 ACS 5-year 
American Indian and Alaska Native Tables on Economic Characteristics. This data consists of 
the number of households within a given income bracket
20
, which is then used to calculate the 
household income bracket % of population and the household income bracket % of income 
earned. The former is calculated by dividing the income bracket’s number of households by the 
total number of households in the tribe. The latter is calculated by dividing the total income 
earned for each bracket divided by the total income earned by the tribe
21
The formula for the Gini 
coefficient estimate is:      
 
   
. The greater the size of area A means the greater inequality. 
The poverty rate is taken directly from the US Census 2010 ACS 5-year American Indian and 
Alaska Native Tables on Economic Characteristics.  This poverty rate covers all people, rather 
than just households. 
 
Capability Indicators 
 
In his Noble prize winning work “Development as Freedom” Amartya Sen proposed a 
 
new set of indicators to measure human welfare. The capabilities approach entails two normative 
claims: 
 
First, the claim that the freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral importance, 
and second, that freedom to achieve well-being is to be understood in terms of people's 
capabilities, that is, their real opportunities to do and be what they have reason to value.
22
 
 
Therefore an individual’s health, education, and family well-being are important indicators of 
their well-being, because they provide opportunities to the individual to do or be what they 
value. Access to good healthcare provides longevity and sustained production throughout life. 
Education access offers means for advancement and gain in human capital. Familial support 
                                                                                                                                           
20 
The income brackets used are 10,000 or less, 10,000-14,999, 15,000-24,999, 25,000-34,999, 35,000-49,999, 
50,000-74,999, 75,000-99,999, 100,000-149,000,150,000-199,999, and 200,000 or more. 
21 
Total earned income for each bracket is calculated by taking the average of the min and max numbers of the range 
 
multiplied by the number of households in the income bracket. The 200,000 or more bracket uses 250,000$ as its 
average. 
22
Martha C. Nussbaum, “Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach”, Harvard University Press, 
2011, 237pp.,
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provides both a financial and emotional pool of support for future endeavors. This study seeks to 
measure health and education like Amartya Sen’s Human Development Index with the additional 
indicator of family. 
 
Health is measured by life expectancy, which is the expected number of years of life 
 
remaining at a given age. The human development index utilizes life expectancy as its 
measurement for health indicators. The data comes from the “Measure of America: of the Social 
Science Research Council” data set, which tracks statewide human develop index measurements 
by state and race across the United States. The measurement is taken from the last reported life 
expectancy of Native Americans within a state. 14 out of the 26 states found in the random 
sample reported a figure within the last 10 years. The latest figure was used for each state. Each 
tribe within the given state received that life expectancy figure. For those tribes in states without 
a reported life expectancy, they were reported as having a measurement of 73, which is the 
average life expectancy of all Native Americans, Thus they were not helped or hurt by not 
having a measurement. 
 
Education is measured by both the percentage of 25 year olds with high school degrees 
and the percentage of 25 year olds with bachelor degrees. The Human Development index 
utilizes literacy and school enrollments as a measure, but in the case of the United States these 
measures are unavailable or not informative. In order to participate in the US economy it is 
critical to have at least a high school degree and to advance in income a bachelor’s degree as 
well. This measurement seeks to capture the tribal government’s ability to provide high school 
level education and opportunities for higher learning. Both measurements are taken directly from 
the US Census 2010 ACS 5-year American Indian and Alaska Native Tables on Social 
Characteristics. 
 
Family is measured by the divorce rate, which is the percentage of the population 
divorced, and the percentage of single parent households among all households. The divorce rate 
seeks to capture the lost financial and emotional benefits from failed marriages, which adversely 
affects both the parents and children. The institution of marriage “provides a wealth-generation 
bonus” through proving economies of scale and specialization23. Also “research has 
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Philips, Alma. “The State of our Unions”. National Marriage Project. n. page. Web. 2012
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consistently shown that divorce and unmarried childbearing increase child poverty.” 24 Therefore 
the single parent household measurement captures a loss of capability of the children from lack 
of familial resources. Both measurements are taken directly from the US Census 2010 ACS 5-
year American Indian and Alaska Native Tables on Social Characteristics. 
 
Living Standards 
 
The Multidimensional Poverty Index is utilized by the United Nations to measure poverty 
 
internationally. Like the human development index it measures health and education, but also 
introduces a new set of indicators under the umbrella of “Standard of Living” instead of income. 
It measures whether or whether not an individual has access to sanitation, clean water, and 
electricity. It also looks at the household’s assets like its type of flooring, or whether or not they 
owns a TV, radio or refrigerator
25
. This study seeks to capture both access and housing assets to 
determine living standards for each tribe. 
 
Housing assets  covered by two measurements: occupants per room and lack complete 
kitchen sets. The former divides the number of occupants living within a house by the number of 
rooms within a house. The study takes the percentage of houses with 1.01 occupants per room or 
more. This measurement seeks to measure overcrowding in houses, which has a large effect on 
children’s development due to lack of parental attention, strained relationships, and ultimately 
educational performance
26
. Lack of complete kitchen sets measures the percentage of the 
population that do not have a sink with piped water, a range, and a refrigerator. This measure 
provides information on a lack of water and assets within the household. Both of these 
measurements are taken from the US Census 2010 ACS 5-year American Indian and Alaska 
Native Tables on Housing Characteristics. 
 
Access seeks to measure a tribe’s access to infrastructure such as plumbing and 
telephones. Both measures take the percentage of the tribe’s population that lack access to 
plumbing and telephone service. Lack of sanitation from a lack of plumbing is a health risk 
because it increases communicable diseases. Lack of telephone service is a safety hazard as well 
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Alkire, Sabina , Adriana Conconi, and José Manuel Roche.” Multidimensional Poverty Index 2013: Brief 
Methodological Note and Results”. Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative. n. page. Web. 2013 
26 
Kopko, Kimberly. “The Effects of the Physical Environment on Children’s Development”. Departments of 
Human Development and Design and Environmental Analysis, Cornell University. n. page. Web.
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as an economic inhibitor. Both of these measurements are taken from the US Census 2010 ACS 5-
year American Indian and Alaska Native Tables on Housing Characteristics. 
 
How is the Index Calculated? 
 
The Tribal Development Index’s calculations utilize the same formulas of the Human 
Development Index to aggregate individual indicators into an index. Each measurement is first put through 
this formula: Index= Value- min / max – min, where min is the lowest value exhibited by a tribe and max 
is the highest value exhibited by a tribe. If a lower measurement reflects higher wellbeing (i.e. 
unemployment rate) then the index formula is subtracted from 1. The result is an index with no units 
associated with it. Then if the measurement has a paired measurement within the sub category like the Gini 
coefficient is paired with poverty rate in the inequality sub-category, the geometric mean is taken, which 
follows this formula:                                . This result is again put through the 
index formula (                      –      , where min is the lowest to make a sub-category 
score. The sub-category scores are then combined to make a total category score by taking the geometric 
mean of the two or three sub-category scores:           √     
                                
       The overall score is then calculated by taking the geometric mean of the three categories: 
√           
    The overall score will be used as the main dependent variable for a statistical tests 
moving forward.  
 
 
Controlling for the Surrounding State 
 
The state in which a tribe is located has a large effect on economic wellbeing of a tribe 
 
because it determines the markets through which the tribe interacts. A tribe in California- median 
income of $57,708- with a casino can draw a higher income consumer than a tribe in Arizona-
median income $46,780. In order to account for this effect within the data analysis each state is given 
a development score using the same exact equations of the tribal development index. Instead of using 
the goal post numbers of the highest or lowest performing state in each measure, the state scores use 
the tribal goal posts. This way the state’s scores are relative to the tribes, rather just relative to each 
other. The tribe’s overall score is then divided by the state overall score in order to get a state- 
controlled overall score. The state-controlled score is the tribe’s percentage of development of their 
host state. For example the Crow Tribe of Montana has a overall tribe score of .415, while the state 
of Montana has a score of .709, so in order to get the state controlled score .415 is divided by .709 to 
get the number .586, which means the Crow Tribe of Montana has 58.6% of the overall development 
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score of the state. The study uses the state controlled overall score in all of its statistical analysis and 
rankings of tribes. 
 
Dependent Variable Findings 
 
This section will describe the findings of the index and analyze their relationship with the 
 
possible explanatory variables of factors of production endowment of land, labor and capital. 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics                                                  
Figure 5 Histogram of State Controlled Overall Score First it is necessary to get an overall 
 
idea of the random sample of 70 tribes under 
study. The state controlled overall score mean 
is .7046 with a standard deviation of .1877, 
which can be interpreted as saying that the 
average tribe is 70.46% as developed as their 
surrounding state with an 18.77% standard 
deviation. The maximum score was the Pala 
Band of Luiseño Mission Indians of the Pala 
Reservation with a score of 1.135 and the 
minimum score was the White Mountain 
Apache Tribe of the Fort Apache Reservation with a score .286. A histogram of the data shows a 
bimodal distribution with peaks at .56 and .80. If one were to look at the data from a regional 
perspective it would show that the predominant majority of tribes in the sample are located west 
of the Mississippi. There is little difference between the mean scores of tribes west of the 
Mississippi (.695) and those east of the Mississippi   Figure 4 Regional Box and Whisker Plot 
(.689). The tribes west of the Mississippi have 
 
a higher distribution in outcomes than the tribes 
east of the Mississippi, which can be seen in 
figure 5. This is important because it shows 
that the vast majority of tribes in the sample 
have a wide regional distribution, which means 
that region has little effect on the state 
controlled overall scores.
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Figure 6 Histogram of Estimated Population     
If one were to look at the sample from a 
population size standpoint one would 
see a left skewed histogram with most 
tribes having less than 500 members. 
The average tribe has a population of 
5,329 members, while the median tribe 
only has 2,528 members. The Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation of Oklahoma has the 
largest population of the sample with 
43,193 members and the Winnebago 
Tribe of Nebraska has the smallest 
population with 429 members. The 
population distribution shows that most 
tribes in the sample have a small enough population size where it is possible for each member to 
know each other, which is an important aspect of a tight knit and cohesive community. 
 
 
Possible Explanatory Variables- Factors of Production Endowment 
 
The classic models of economic development focus on an economy’s lack of endowments of the  
 
factors of productions as a causal factor determining development. These factors of production 
are land, labor, and capital. The theory poses that economies with higher levels of factor 
endowments will have higher economic development. The analysis uses tribal population over 
16 as a proxy for labor, tribal land in square miles as a proxy for land, and total tribal income 
(mean income multiplied by total population) as a proxy for capital.
27
 A linear regression test 
shows that none of these endowments have a statistically significant positive correlation with the 
state controlled overall tribal development score: 
                                                                                      
 
27 
Tribal Land is determined by total square miles of tribal land and tribal trust land from US Census 2010 American 
Indian/Alaska Native/Native Hawaiian Areas Gazetteer Files. Labor is determined by population over 16 in 2010 
ACS 5-year American Indian and Alaska Native Tables of Economic Characteristics. Capital is determined by mean 
income from the 2010 ACS 5-year American Indian and Alaska Native Tables of Economic Characteristics 
multiplied by the estimated population.
21 
 
 
Coefficients
a 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients 
 
 
Standardized t Sig. 
 
Coefficients 
 
B 
 
(Constant) .703 
Std. Error Beta 
 
.027 26.268 .000 
 
Land 
1 
Labor 
 
Capital 
-1.429E-005 .000 
 
1.672E-006 .000 
 
6.671E-012 .000 
-.095 -.754 .454 
 
.126 .793 .430 
 
.007 .046 .963 
 
a. Dependent Variable: State Controlled Overall Score 
 
 
The lack of significant relationships from land, labor and capital shows that presence of factor 
endowments are not enough to guarantee development, but rather there is different explanatory 
variable: institutions. Institutions are the vehicles through which the factors of production are 
converted into economic activity and economic activity into development. The next chapter will 
discuss how institutions contribute to economic activity and provide public goods that raise the 
overall development of people.
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Independent Variables 
 
 
This chapter will examine the political-economy theory behind legitimacy, property 
 
rights, accountability, and the rule of law and how these concepts interact with tribal collectivist 
societies. Each concept will have a series of independent variables used to measure different 
types of institutional designs and characteristics. 
 
Legitimacy 
 
Max Weber described legitimacy as “the basis of every system of authority, and 
 
correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which 
persons exercising authority are lent prestige.”28According to Weber there are three main sources 
of legitimacy: legality, tradition, and charisma. Legality refers to faith in the rational reason of the 
law; tradition, faith in the customs and social order of the past; charisma, faith in the ruler
29
. 
Whether or whether not a system of authority has legitimacy determines whether or whether not 
the citizens or subjects of that system of authority have a political or moral obligation to obey the 
law. Tribal governments are unique in that they are based on both traditional and legal authority. 
The traditional authority is rooted in the sovereignty of the tribe and the traditional institutional 
designs of the tribal government. Such traditional institutional designs may include the utilization 
of clan or band structures in voting, or the use of traditional courts for dispute resolution, or the 
integration of hereditary positions into the government. Legal authority is derived from a 
rationally designed constitution and a set of formal institutional designs that dictate how an 
individual comes into a position and the specific authority of that position. Most tribes have 
constitutions that have formal rules for voting, and clear boundaries for each position in the tribal 
government. These rules can both codify tradition and establish new ways of governance. 
 
The first and most important aspect of creating legitimate governance is establishing a 
sovereign tribe composed of members from a traditional collective entity. Tribal sovereignty is 
critical because it establishes the collective entity of the tribe. If other people, who are not 
traditionally part of the tribe are included, it divides the collective will of the tribe. The collective 
                                                                                                                                                                                
28 
Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Univ of California Press, 1978. 
29 
See 28 
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will is best understood through the work of Rousseau. In Rousseau’s conception of the state of 
nature in A Discourse on the Inequality of Man, man is not in a prisoner’s dilemma, where the 
overriding incentive is to cheat others, but rather in a stag hunt situation. In the stag hunt situation 
both sides will benefit the most from cooperation, but may not out of distrust or lack of 
communication of intentions. This state of affairs resembles the actual incentives inherent in 
tribal societies. Hunter-gatherer, pastoralist, and horticulturalist societies all rely on collective 
cooperation rather than individual accomplishment to procure resources. The stag hunt problem is 
solved through a social contract among a community, where the general will of the community 
forces people to be free, which means it forces people to act towards collective will in order to 
gain the most collective good. Yet Rousseau limits the size and composition of a community to 
be small enough for everyone to know each other, one with a unity of origin, interest or 
convention, and lastly, “one in which unites the consistency of an ancient people with the 
docility of a new one.
30” In order for the general or collective will of the tribe to be effective it 
must have institutions through which it can be translated into law and policy. 
 
Traditional institutional designs have the advantage of being uniquely adapted to the 
tribe, because they are the products of hundreds of years of small decisions by tribal members to 
solve small collective action problems that came up over time. They are well known and 
respected by the community because they have been ingrained through communal norms and 
values. Legal institutional designs have the advantage of creating big and synthesized formal 
mechanisms through which people can solve big collective action problems in real time. They 
allow people to organize and express their will in predictable and clear ways that spur change. 
Yet if these institutions are imposed from the outside without any connection to past traditions 
upon an entity without a traditional collective identity, than the government will fail to be 
legitimate. This is best illustrated through the example of the San Carlos Apache Tribe of the San 
Carlos Reservation
31
: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                        
30 
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. Social Contract & Discourses. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1913; Bartleby.com, 
2010. 
31 
Source of case study Record, Ian W. "Broken Government." (1999). 
http://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/1999_RECORD_broken_government.pdf
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Case Study 1: San Carlos Apache Tribe of the San Carlos Reservation 
 
 
The San Carlos Apache Tribe of the San Carlos reservation is located in Arizona with an 
estimated population of 10,900 members. . It is ranked 61
st 
out of 70 tribes in the tribal 
development index with a state controlled overall score of .523. The San Carlos Apache 
Reservation was not established in 1873 for a cohesive pre-white contact tribal nation, but 
rather it was a place to “consolidate the remaining non-reservation Apaches in a remote 
location.” In fact some of the original bands were enemies of each other with some bands 
fighting under the famed Geronimo and other bands serving as scouts for the US Army. The 
BIA directly ruled the tribe until 1934 IRA gave power to a newly formed tribal government. 
In the process of its rule it sought to destroy the traditional authority structures of the tribe in 
favor of a business committee composed of “English speaking Apaches and Yavapais 
amenable to their plans,” which later formed the core of the new IRA government. The IRA 
constitution gave complete power to the tribal council with little separation of powers 
between legislative and executive power. From 1934 to today the San Carlos reservation has 
seen a “pronounced degree of institutional instability” due to the failures of the constitution in 
addition to “clan divisiveness and familial factionalism” that contributes to a high turnover in 
tribal officials. Worst of all the tribe has been beset by corruption and in some cases violence, 
where the tribal law enforcement officers suppressed dissent from protests. A constitutional 
structure imposed without underlying traditional legitimacy only serves to benefit the 
individuals who use it for their own ends, rather than a united tribe with a collective identity 
and goal of advancement. 
 
 
 
 
The San Carlos Tribe is not a lone example, but rather a common story among a myriad of 
tribes with imposed IRA constitutions that do not reflect the underlying traditions of the tribe or 
the collective make-up of the tribe. Yet a tribal constitution based solely on codified traditions 
has its problems as well. It lacks the predictability and logic of rationally designed system 
makes it vulnerable to abuse by unaccountable political elite. The Oneida Nation of New York 
provides an example of the failures of purely traditional government:
32
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In order to test which types of constitutions better serve collectivist tribal societies, the study 
will code each constitution as either IRA imposed, traditional, or hybrid. IRA imposed 
constitutions are constitutions ratified under the IRA act during its original push from 1936 to 
1947
33
. Traditional constitutions will include tribes without written constitutions or 
constitutions that are codifications of traditional institutions
34
. Hybrid constitutions are 
constitutions ratified after 1947, which contain both traditional and legal institutional designs. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
32 
Source of case study Vargas , Theresa , and Annys Shin. “Oneida Indian Nation is the tiny tribe taking on the NFL 
and Dan Snyder over Redskins name”. Washington Post, November 16, 2014. 
33
List of tribes come from this 1947 BIA report on the IRA: Hass, Theadore. “Ten Years of Tribal Government 
Under I. R. A”. United States Indian Service. (1947)
Case Study 2: Traditional Constitution- The Oneida Nation of New York  
The Oneida Nation of New York utilizes the same governing structure today as it did 
before white contact. It is composed of three clans: turtle, wolf, and bear. Each of these clans 
chooses two male representatives, who by tradition are responsible for daily decisions, while clan 
mothers are in charge of long-term decisions.  The advantages and disadvantages of a completely 
traditional government are best seen through the career of Ray Halbritter, who still leads the 
Oneida Nation as the Oneida Indian Nation representative since 1975 and Chief Executive since 
1990. Supporters of “hail him as a great leader who has pulled his people out of poverty,” while 
his opponents “condemn him as an opportunist who has amassed a fortune at the expense of 
others.” A former ironworker, and graduate of Harvard Law School, Halbritter spearheaded the 
building of tribal casinos on Oneida land, which today bring in revenue from 200 to 400 million 
dollars a year. Halbritter himself has become a wealthy man in the process with some claiming he 
is a billionaire, which he denies. Critics say not all Oneidas have benefitted from the newfound 
casino wealth. Tribe members tell of receiving stipends of $16,000 a year, “but only if Halbritter 
approves them.” Doug George-Kanentiio, the co-founder of the Native American Journalists 
Association, claims he “systematically strips” dissenting Oneida tribesmen of their membership 
and that “he answers to no one.” The traditional form of government has the advantage of strong 
legitimacy, but lacks the advantages of accountability and rule of law found in constitutional 
forms of government.    
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Property Rights 
 
Property rights are a bundle of rights that determine access, withdrawal, exclusion, 
 
alienation, transfer, and/or control of a tangible or intangible resource. Such resources could be 
natural resources like copper, plots of land, artificial property like stocks, consumer items like 
clothes, or intangible resources like ideas and art. Property rights can be assigned to individuals, 
or collective entities like firms, organizations, or the state. Private property refers to a “regime in 
which no more than a small number of persons have access to a resource,” while public property 
is “when more than a small number” have access to a resource35. Private Property can be split 
into individual and household ownership. There are three types of public property: group, horde, 
and open-access. Group property “refers to ownership by a collectivity whose membership is 
larger than a household's but small enough to permit intermittent face-to-face interaction.” Land 
in which those given access are larger than a group, but not universal is horde property. Open-
access refers to land regimes where privileges of entry are universal. 
 
Property rights are established in order to avoid the Tragedy of the Commons. The 
 
underlying logic behind these problems are that individual’s incentives when 
confronting common pool resources in an open access regime result in collectively inferior 
outcomes than if they established property rights. In the tragedy of the commons a group of 
people each have incentives to consume as much as possible of a common pool resource 
until it is exhausted, because they do not trust their counterparts to restrain. Property rights are 
designed to set rules of access that allow for a sustainable expropriation of a common pool 
resource, which over the long run will benefit each individual more than consuming as much 
as possible in the first place. There are three property rights strategies used to avoid the 
Tragedy of the Commons and achieve the greatest collective good: privatization, 
centralization, and common pool resource institutions
36
. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
34 
This includes all Pueblo tribes in the sample, Tuscara Nation, Oneida Nation, and Penescobat Nation 
35 
Ellickson, Robert C. “Property in Land”. Yale Law Journal (1993): 1315-1400 
36 
Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge 
university press, 1990. 8-11
27 
 
Privatization 
 
Tribal social organizations are the results of geographic conditions that are inimical to 
 
private property rights. Such geographic rights include mountainous areas, deserts, vast plains, 
and dense forests. These types of regions can only support pastoralist or horticulturalist resource 
procurement systems without large-scale irrigation or forest clearing projects. Pastoralists require 
large tracts of land to shepherd their livestock, which makes marking individual boundaries 
prohibitive. Horticulturalists do not produce enough surplus from individual plots to support land 
investments or a substantial non-agrarian economy. Increase in parcel size would improve 
returns, but it would entail extensive irrigation or forest clearing, which individuals cannot 
procure on their own. Geography requires group organizations for pastoralists in order to mark 
boundaries and enforce rules on access to prevent over grazing, and for horticulturalists in order 
to provide capital for irrigation and forest clearance. 
 
Another important area of property rights is to consider mineral rights, which are rights to 
 
natural resource extraction from a piece of land. In a private property system individual owners 
would hold ownership of the mineral rights underneath their land. Natural resource deposits tend 
to cover large amounts of area and are extremely capital intensive to extract. Thus they involve 
large amounts of landowners and require large amounts of capital, which could only be provided 
by a collective organization or outside firm/investor. In the latter case only the land owners of 
the natural resource would gain from selling their mineral rights, while the surrounding 
community would suffer from the associated externalities of resource extraction like pollution 
and environmental degradation. 
 
Native American history provides an illustrative example of the inadequacies of private 
property systems providing development for tribal societies. The General Allotment Act, known 
as the Dawes Act of 1887 sought to ‘assimilate’ Native Americans into American society by 
making them into independent farmers, and breaking the social structure of the tribe. The act 
unilaterally dismembered each tribe’s land into individual plots of 160 acres to each family or 60 
acres to each individual. If the tribe did not have enough land for 160 acres each, then it was 
dispersed evenly with some families receiving as little as 10 acres. The ‘surplus’ land was then 
sold off or leased to white farmers and ranchers and such sales and rents would be held by the 
BIA in trust. The title to each allotment was held in ‘trust’, which prevented its sale and taxation 
in order to ’protect’ the Native American land from White encroachment. Yet even this 
restriction was mostly rescinded by amendments in 1906 that gave the Secretary of the Interior 
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power to determine an allottee owner ‘competent’, and thus able to sell their land or be taxed. 
The result of the law was a humanitarian disaster that saw further impoverishment of Native 
Americans and a loss of over 90 million acres of land
37
. It was repealed in 1934 and generally 
“historians have concluded that the Dawes Act was a failure.”38 
 
 The Dawes Act failed primarily due to two reasons: Native American inability to farm 
the area due to social and geographic constraints, and the exploitation of white settlers. The law 
primarily applied to tribes in the West, who for centuries followed a pastoralist, subsistence 
farming and hunter gather resource procurement strategy due the environment of the West. The 
Southwest desert is unable to sustain agriculture without heavy irrigation. The Western plains 
originally had plenty of wild game in the form of buffalo herds until their near extinction late in 
the 19
th 
century by white traders. The Indian Wars of the late 19
th 
century also pushed tribes off 
more fertile land and forced them into the mountains and deserts. Before the allotment act the 
tribal land was held in common with men primarily focused on nomadic hunting and 
pastoralism, while women pursued subsistence farming. Thus when the Dawes Act allotted land 
to individual families and expected male head of households to till the land they lacked all the 
factors of production to make a successful economic enterprise. The land was inhospitable; labor 
had little to no experience or knowledge of farming; the dissolution of the tribe and lack of 
capital markets made capital non-existent. Thus whenever an allottee lost trust status to their 
land they soon were forced into bankruptcy from property taxes or they leased or sold the land 
to white settlers who had the expertise and capital to develop the land. Studies show that a 
tribe’s land allotment date was correlated with the demand from surrounding white settlers for 
the land in question
39
. White settlers quickly bought and leased the most fertile and natural 
resource rich tribal trust land from individual impoverished Native Americans or the federal 
government’s ‘surplus’ land, which created a checkerboard pattern of land ownership among 
Native American Reservations. Since the Dawes Act is a century old its effects would not be 
easily discernible in the data set based 2010 data, therefore this study will not develop an 
independent variable to measure it, but rather will judge it on its historical outcomes in the 
results and analysis section. 
                                             
37 
Malmgren, Rachel, and Garrick Small, eds. Indigenous Peoples and Real Estate Valuation. Springer, 2008. 
38 
Carlson, Leonard A. "The Dawes Act and the Decline of Indian farming." The Journal of Economic History 38, 
no. 01 (1978): 274-276. 
39 
See 38
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Centralization 
 
The centralization property rights strategy uses the power of coercion in order to alter 
 
individual incentives towards cooperation and more collective gain. The logic behind this 
strategy says that individuals have overriding incentives to defect or cheat, so there needs to be a 
centralized entity that will punish those who will defect. For example, a nation’s oil deposits 
could be considered a common pool resource. Individuals/ individual firms all have incentives to 
buy a portion of land on top of the deposit and drill as much as quickly as possible before the 
deposit collapses in on itself. Yet, every individual will have the same incentives and thus the 
excessive drilling will not only glut the market reducing profits for all, but also reducing the total 
quantity of oil that deposit could have produced. Thus the logic of a centralized system says that 
all oil deposits should be nationalized or centralized under central governments control. The 
government will then control or regulate the extraction of oil in order to extract enough oil to 
maintain high prices and prevent the collapse of the deposit. The theory also posits that the 
central government will internalize the externalities of oil extraction to maximize the collective 
gain from the resource extraction. The central government also has the capital resources to make 
the necessary investments to extract a resource. 
 
Elinor Ostrom identified problems with the central government approach in regulating or 
 
controlling common pool resource extraction. The central government lacks enough local 
knowledge to make efficient decisions. Instead of making rulings or laws on the ground with 
knowledge of the surrounding environment, and local populace conditions centralized entities 
make technocratic decisions based on theory and impersonal data from far away. Centralized 
institutions also require expensive administration and monitoring in order to enforce these rules. 
This monitoring has a high propensity of error due to a lack of local knowledge and legitimacy 
among the enforcers, who would be outsiders. Yet the worse and most destructive aspect of 
centralized control over resources is a lack of accountability to the people most affected by the 
resource extraction. Even in a democracy a surrounding population only makes up a small 
percentage of the overall electorate, which means the central government has no incentive to 
control externalities or distribute the gains from extraction fairly
40
. 
 
In Native American history the BIA is the centralized institution that has controlled 
Native American resources in two ways: tribal trust land and paternalistic economic development 
schemes. Tribal trust land is the land that remained after a Tribe’s land was allotted according to 
30 
 
the Dawes Act. This land remained under tribal ownership, but was in federal trust status, which 
meant that the BIA managed it for the ‘benefit’ of the tribe. This management takes the form of 
needing the approval of the Secretary of the Interior for all land use decisions and in some cases 
the leasing of trust land by the BIA without the consent of the tribe. The other form of 
centralized control is paternalistic economic development programs and schemes that from the 
60s to the 80s the “United States has poured hundreds of millions of dollars into reservation 
economic problems” with “substantive progress on the economic front [proving] frustratingly 
elusive.
41” Many tribes have become dependent on federal transfer programs and federally 
funded government services rather than enterprise led growth. Therefore in order to test how 
large the BIA’s presence is in a tribe’s economy, this study uses the percentage of the population 
who work for the federal, state, or local government. Higher percentage of public workers 
translates to higher numbers of tribal members who work for the BIA or the tribal government’s 
social programs
42
. 
 
Common Pool Resource (CPR) Institutions 
 
Political-economist Elinor Ostrom in her Noble prize winning book “Governing the 
 
Commons” proposed a ‘third way’ that was neither privatization nor centralization, which have 
been the dominant paradigms for the last century of political-economic thought. She stated that 
property rights could be vested in local institutions, rather than free markets or central states. 
Through an empirical analysis of these type of institutions throughout history she isolated 6 
features of successful CPR Institutions: 1) Clearly defined boundaries, 2) Appropriate rules take 
advantage of local knowledge, 3) community participation, 4) Monitors are accountable to 
appropriators, 5) Graduated sanctions, 6) Low enforcement and transaction costs
43
. Since 
the1980s tribal governments have relied on CPR institutions called Tribal Business Enterprises to 
lead economic development. These institutions are similar to private corporate firms in 
organization and legality with the key difference that instead of paying dividends and reporting 
to shareholders they pay dividends and report to the tribal government. They use capital from the 
tribal government to develop tribal common pool resources and employ tribal members. Tribal 
Business Enterprises match Ostrom’s conception of successful CPR institutions. 
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A tribe’s boundaries can be both geographic and/or demographic. Geographically a tribe 
can lay claim to an area of land that has been traditional homelands of the tribe and are populated 
by mostly tribal members. This type of territory would encompass only rural or natural areas 
outside of major cities and large-scale agricultural development. As noted earlier, tribes typically 
occupy geographically isolated and inhospitable land, so through negotiation and surveys there 
can be a jurisdictional separation between major cities and intensive agricultural areas, which 
require different forms of political institutions more akin to Western precepts. Deserts, mountains, 
and dense forests do not support intensive economic activity, but tend to be rich in natural 
resources like mineral deposits, oil, lumber, and wild game. For example, the Ute Indian Tribe of 
the Uintah and Ouray Reservation and the Ute Mountain Tribe have significant oil deposits, 
while the Three Affiliated Tribes in North Dakota and Coeur d’Alene Tribe have deposits of rare 
earth metals.
44
 
 
Tribes also have demographic boundaries as well because tribal membership is determined by 
lineage rather than geographic location. Giving membership rights to urban tribal members gives 
individuals both a cultural and financial tie back to their homeland. This benefit runs both ways 
with members investing money and retuning home for cultural events as well as the tribe 
providing public goods like higher education and trade networks in urban areas. For example the 
Hopi Nation provides $1500 per month stipend/scholarship to tribal members attending college 
with 3.5 GPA
45
. A fundamental problem in developing economies is a lack of trust, which results 
in ethnic specialization of trades. This is because tribal networks provide relationships and a 
community among geographically separated people, which gives individuals reputational 
incentives to be trustworthy. A possible business cheater would have to consider the social costs 
of cheating as well as the legal risks. For example the “Hausa in Ibadan, Nigeria, both own 
houses and broker long distance trade in cattle and koala nuts,” so “if the brokers cheat their 
business partners…they leave behind valuable houses as hostages.”46 Tribal business enterprises 
can scale up larger than the typical family businesses in developing countries, while maintaining 
a sufficient level of trust to do business. Thus tribal entities are not dependent on a land base, but 
rather a vehicle through which people organize themselves to procure resources. 
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Local knowledge not only includes knowledge of the environment, but also knowledge of 
the traditions and customs that have sustained that tribe for generations. Tribal enterprises can 
reflect traditional ways of life for economic benefit. For example the Pueblo of Taos maintains a 
traditional village, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, year-round to attract tourists. They sell local 
crafts, give tours, perform ceremonies, and educate the general public on their culture and way of 
life
47
. Tribal casinos reflect in their design and appearance the local tradition and customs of the 
tribe. T r i b a l  cultural valuation of the environment and sustainability has led to investments in 
renewable energy. Tribal businesses both employ tribal members and their profits contribute to 
the general welfare of the tribe. Through the use of local knowledge, incorporation of traditions, 
employment of and benefit to the community, tribal businesses provide legitimate and fair 
economic activities. 
 
Tribal Business Enterprises are also accountable to the people, whose resources they 
 
develop. Rather than far off shareholders or central government bureaucrats, the tribal enterprises 
are accountable to the tribal government, who are responsible for the externalities and the long-
term sustainment of the resources being developed, which are incentivized to limit externalities 
and promote long-term sustainability of resources. For example, the Hopi tribe and Navajo 
Nation of New Mexico both prohibited the mining of uranium on tribal land out of concern for 
its environmental health effects. As legal entities similar to corporate entities they have the 
advantages of the firm to organize themselves in order to minimize transaction costs and 
enforcement costs according to market conditions and the specific resources they are developing. 
 
 In order to test the effectiveness of tribal business enterprises in contributing to tribal 
development this study will look at two variables: percentage of private workers, and the number of 
casinos the tribe owns.
48
 Private workers are defined as those working for profit making enterprises, 
which includes tribal business enterprises. Therefore the higher percentage of private workers means 
the higher number of tribal members employed by tribal business enterprises and thus the higher 
percentage it has in the overall economy. The number of casinos in a tribe is an informative number 
because casinos can be considered a common pool resource and the tribal business enterprises that run 
them can be considered CPR institutions. At first glance casinos do not seem to be common pool 
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resources, but in the case of tribal sovereignty in the federal system they are. In states where gambling 
is illegal tribal sovereignty grants each tribe within the state a possible monopoly power in their 
geographic area. This monopoly power is subject to the same tragedy of the commons as natural 
resources are. If individual tribal citizens were each able to open a casino within tribal territory, than 
the monopoly profits would quickly be decreased by competition, which would help the outlying 
outside consumer population at the expense of the tribe. Casinos are a common pool resource because 
exclusion of multiple sources tapping into this monopoly can be done through the tribe itself 
establishing its own casinos and outlawing the right of individual tribal members to build casinos. 
Casinos are established through tribal business enterprises and more casinos generally mean the tribe is 
making more profits from that enterprise. One would expect, that more profit from a common pool 
resource would naturally translate into more general benefits for the entire tribe, but this relationship is 
not necessary true all the time. If one were to look internationally at the areas of large oil deposits, one 
would find that the tribal people who either own or inhabit that land do not benefit from the common 
pool resource. One only needs to look at the indigenous tribes of Ecuador, the Shiite tribes of Saudi 
Arabia, and the Okonjo-iweala tribe of Nigeria to see the harmful effects of what is commonly called 
the ‘resource curse’ on the tribal owners of the land. Thus, if every member of the tribe benefits from 
casinos, then it would show that CPR institutions may defeat the resource curse. 
 
Accountability 
 
Accountability refers to the institutional methods through which a person of authority 
 
gains or loses their position. Political actors rely on the support of others in order to gain or retain their 
offices. The necessary support to retain office may range from a few political elites to thousands of 
voters depending on the political institutions. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph 
Siverson, and James Morrow in “The Logic of Political Survival” base their analysis on one core 
insight: a politician’s desire to stay in office motivates the selection of policies and the allocation of 
benefits
49
. Their selectorate theory focuses on a political leader’s necessary winning coalition, or their 
necessary support, needed to gain and maintain power. As noted in the section on legitimacy, a tribal 
government’s ability to reflect the collective will of the tribe is an important part of its legitimacy. As 
noted in the section on property rights CPR institutions also depend on accountability to the collective  
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will in order for tribal business enterprises to have the incentives to limit externalities, promote 
sustainable resource development, and distribute the gains equally and fairly. Therefore in order 
to reflect the collective will of the people tribal institutions must require the largest possible 
winning coalition of tribal members. This section will first explore the general composition of 
tribal governments and the competing methods of electing legislative and executive tribal 
officials on the basis of collective accountability. 
 
Tribal Government Composition 
 
The typical tribal government is composed of three branches: legislative, executive, and 
 
judicial. The legislative branch is composed of the tribal council, whose members are usually 
 
elected by the tribe, but in some traditional systems members are selected by their clans, or a 
special body of elders in the case of some Pueblo tribes. Tribal council members are usually 
elected by either a staggered vote by the entire tribe or a biannual vote by districts. The average 
number of council members in this random sample is 8.87, but the number varies depending on 
the population size of the tribe. The average term limit is 2.7 years with 2 years as the mode. In 
the model IRA constitution imposed on many tribes there is no separation of powers between the 
legislative and executive branch. The executive takes the form of the chairman of the tribal 
council and is elected by the council like a CEO is elected by a board of directors. In other tribal 
constitutions the tribal executive is elected by popular vote of the tribe and is in charge of the 
tribal government bureaucracy. The tribal executive chairs the tribal council, but can only vote 
on tie breakers. The average term is the same as tribal council members. 
 
Legislative Elections 
 
The two competing methods for legislative elections are biannual voting by district or 
 
staggered voting by the entire tribe. The former entails arbitrarily dividing the population into 
equal parts and then electing a representative for that district every two or four years. This is an 
individualistic Western institution because it incentivizes representatives to focus on their part of 
the whole instead of the welfare of the collective whole. Representatives are beholden to the 
interests of a small geographically contiguous constituency, which forces them to only propose 
policies that will benefit their district, and fight policies that may harm it. In a individualistic 
settled society this is beneficial because it insures public good procurement, where all benefit 
like defense, and a fair share of particular public goods from political horse trading, but it slows 
down the collective will when one district needs to bear costs for the collective benefit. District 
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voting is also subject to gerrymandering, which matches candidates to voters, rather than voters 
to candidates. Staggered voting by the entire tribe entails an election of a fraction of council 
member every year. It allows for annual elections that don’t completely turn out experienced 
councilmen based on a bad year, but communicate the same voter displeasure to politicians. The 
collective will is always exerted on tribal council members, whether through competing in 
elections are observing the results of other’s elections. 
 
In addition to continuously reflecting the collective will of the tribe, staggered elections 
 
also produce a larger winning coalition necessary for election. Suppose a tribal council consists 
of 7 members, 6 councilmen and 1 separately elected chairman. In an annual 1/3 staggered 
election 2 members of the council would be up for election for the entire tribe. Therefore there 
would be 4 candidates up for election, which means in order to be elected a candidate would 
realistically need at least 26% of the vote assuming the vote parcels out evenly. A district voting 
system would have all 6 members up for election in electorates consisting of 16.6% of the 
population. A 51% minimum margin of victory only requires 8.3% of the electorate. Factoring in 
voting turnout the staggered system requires winning coalition of 13% of the population, while a 
district voting system requires 4.15% of the population. In a tribe with only 1,000 members that 
means in order to be elected by district voting a candidate would only need the support of 42 
people, which could easily be the size of an the candidate’s extended family and friends. A 
candidate seeking election by staggered vote would require over 130 members of the tribe for 
support. Therefore this study analyzes and codes all of the constitutions of the tribes in the 
random sample in order to answer the following question: are tribal council members elected by 
district voting or the entire tribe
50
. 
 
Executive Elections 
 
The two competing methods of election are between the tribal council electing the tribal 
 
chairman by majority vote or the entire tribe electing the tribal executive by popular vote. The 
 
former method of election is specifically a individualistic western approach to governance rather 
than collectivist, because it relies on majoritarian and elitists principles, rather than consensus 
principles. Locke favored a government composed of representatives of the people, who would 
vote in their interests. This elected body of political elites would then have discretion to pass  
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laws by majority vote. Therefore in this conception the tribal chairman is the leader of this 
representative body who controls the majority of the body like a prime minster or CEO. The 
collectivist tribal approach to governance favors consensus over majoritarian principles
51
. In this 
conception the tribal executive is a consensus builder directly accountable to the people, rather 
than a leader of the majority faction. Rather than majority voting power, the tribal executive has 
agenda power, which allows them to guide discussion in the council to a consensus, rather than 
pass laws at the expense of the loyal opposition. 
 
In addition to promoting consensus principles, electing tribal executives by popular vote 
requires significantly larger winning coalitions to gain and retain office. As the tribal council 
chairman and administrator of the tribal government the tribal executive has agenda setting and 
administrative power, which could be used to both provide public goods in the form of 
government services and private goods in the form of patronage jobs. Thus it is important to 
make sure the tribal executive depends on a large winning coalition. If it is assumed the tribe 
uses runoff elections where the candidate or incumbent must have at least 50% of the eligible 
vote to gain or survive in office, then assuming only half the population votes in the election the 
winner would require a winning coalition of at least 25% of the total population of the tribe. Such 
a winning coalition would be too large to pay off with just private goods, so the tribal executive 
would have to focus on public good provision. In the second option the tribal executive is 
indirectly elected through the popularly elected tribal council. This method of election  
dramatically shrinks the winning coalition to just a handful of people. Although the councilmen 
are directly accountable to the people, the tribal executive has a better chance of concentrating 
private goods on a couple of individual council members in order to maintain power than 25% of 
the tribe, which usurps the collective will of the tribe for the particular will of the tribal 
chairman. For Rousseau, when the particular will usurps the general will, it results in the loss of 
sovereignty, and thus the loss of legitimacy for the government. Therefore this study analyzes 
and codes all of the constitutions of the tribes in the random sample in order to answer the 
following question: is the tribal executive elected by the tribal council by majority vote or by 
popular vote of the tribe
52
. 
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Rule of Law 
 
Rousseau and Kant define the rule of law as the replacement of the personal arbitrary rule 
 
of one person with the legitimate rules and laws dictated by the general or collective will. The 
first section on legitimacy spoke to the importance of a unified collective will as the basis for 
legitimacy. The second section on property rights spoke of the institutions that translate 
collective resources into collective economic activity and development. The previous section 
described institutional designs that are accountable to the collective will. The institutions under 
study in this section describe institutions that enforce and interpret the rulings and laws of the 
collective will in order to prevent the arbitrary personal rule of others. These institutions are 
commonly referred to as the justice system, which is composed of the police who enforce the 
collective will and the courts, who interpret the collective will on a case by case basis. Justice 
refers to the fair rulings or interpretation of law according to a society’s traditions, norms, and 
values. Collectivist tribal societies and individualistic settler societies have different paradigms 
for determining justice. The former paradigm is collectivist, which is based on a “holistic 
philosophy” that focuses on “a circle of justice that connects everyone involved with a problem 
or conflict on a continuum, with everyone focused on the same center.”53 The center refers to 
the underlying issues that need to be resolved for the individuals and community to have peace 
and harmony. The latter paradigm is personal, which is based on a “retributive philosophy that 
is hierarchical, adversarial, punitive, and guided by codified laws and written rules, procedures, 
and guidelines.
54” It is premised on the notion that criminals are bad people, who are personally 
responsible for their actions. The justice system serves to first determine guilt, and then punish 
the criminal to deter others, and for societal revenge purposes. These alternate paradigms of 
justice require different types of institutions to enforce and interpret the laws justly and not 
arbitrarily. 
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Police Provision 
 
Just enforcement of laws in collectivist tribal societies requires the adherence to two 
 
principles in determining provision of police: collective accountability and local knowledge. 
Collective accountability reduces the chances of corruption, which is a pervasive problem in 
developing countries. Police will set up road blocks or seize property in order to demand bribes. 
In some places the “police themselves rob the poor or are in cahoots with the criminals.55” The 
problem of corruption increases as the distance of chain of command increases between the 
policeman and the public officials in charge of them. This is because the public official must 
delegate tasks, which means they “lose control and now suffer from asymmetric information 
with respect to these ‘intermediaries.” 56 The police now have discretion as to whether to report 
misbehaviors of the population or their own misbehaviors. The greater number of intermediaries, 
the greater the problem. Local institutions not only drastically decrease the numbers of 
intermediaries, but also increase the number of people the police are accountable to. In a 
centralized system each individual police officer is only legally accountable to their immediate 
superior, but in the case of local institutions each police officer is socially accountable to each 
member of the community. If they were to engage in corruption, then the community could 
socially punish the police officer by ostracism. Corrupt police officers impose their own arbitrary 
personal rule on the population, rather than the collective will of the laws. 
 
Local knowledge is needed in order to engender trust within the community, and to be more 
 
accurate in catching law violators. Police work requires extensive communication with and 
knowledge of the local population. The former is needed to get tips on possible violations or to 
collect witness testimony to find the perpetrator. Trust is a critical need for if the people do not 
trust the police they will not help the police, and may even actively oppose them. Lack of trust 
will especially be a problem if the policeman is of another ethnicity. Local knowledge of the 
community is also critical in picking out regular violators from the crowd. An outsider will 
have a hard time differentiating between the civilian population, while a member of the 
community personally knows the character and past behaviors of all its members. Having better 
knowledge not only increases the odds of successfully catching violators, but decreases the 
chances of mistakenly punishing an innocent person, which engenders distrust and enmity 
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among the local population. Collective tribal societies rely on everyone to enforce the collective 
will, rather than an impersonal police force divorced from the community. 
 
These two principles together holds that the police must be answerable to the tribal government 
 
rather than an outside agency controlled by centralized authorities like the BIA or FBI, or 
unaccountable neighboring settler institutions like state or local government police forces and be 
composed of tribal members to take advantage of local knowledge. Therefore this study utilizes a 
2002 Bureau of Justice Statistics Survey on tribal justice systems to answer the following 
question: does the tribe utilize primarily tribal police or outside sources for police provision? 
Outside sources include the BIA, FBI, State police, and local police. If a tribe uses only tribal 
police and one other outside source, than it is determined to primarily use tribal police. If a tribe 
utilizes two or more outside sources for police provision than it is coded as primarily using 
outside sources. 
 
Court Systems 
 
Different paradigms of justice result in different types of institutional designs or court 
 
systems. Western individualistic court systems are based on impersonal procedures and 
guidelines designed to assess guilt and assign appropriate punishment based on previous 
precedents or law. Such institutions are necessary in settler and urban societies due to the lack of 
personal contact and communal cohesion in everyday life. The impersonal market system 
requires an impersonal and predictable system that enforces contracts between people without 
any personal relations. Retributive justice provides predictable deterrence, which alters 
individual’s incentives to cheat on their agreements. For human security matters the state serves 
as Hobbes’ Leviathan, who punishes those who transgress the laws that protect the collective 
security of the polity. The primary purpose of individualistic western court systems is to solve 
the prisoner’s dilemma problem by deterring transgressions of contracts and laws through 
retributive justice that imposes costs on deleterious behavior. 
 Individualistic Western formal court systems are ineffective when applied to collectivist 
tribal societies. Traditional justice systems are based on reparative or restorative justice, which 
seeks to repair or mend personal and communal relationships. It is based on the stag hunt game, 
where a defector only defects out of a lack of trust or communication with their counterpart. 
Therefore in order to reestablish trust and justice “it is essential for the offender to make amend 
through apology, asking forgiveness, making restitution, and engaging in acts that demonstrate a 
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sincerity to make things right.
57” Tribal justice systems today based on traditional tribal justice 
utilize varying combinations of family and community forums, traditional courts, quasi-modern 
and modern tribal courts. Peacemaker courts are an illustrative example of traditional courts
58
: 
 
 
Case Study 3: Peace Making Courts- Stockbridge Munsee Community 
 
 
The Peacemaking Court is intended to “provide formal support, structure and enforcement to 
 
traditional Mohican methods of resolving disputes through mediation and the use of 
traditional ways.” The courts rules are to be interpreted liberally and informally with the goal 
of “providing a fair, informal, inexpensive and traditional means of resolving disputes.” The 
guiding principles for the court are harmony, non-coercion, community health, and sacred 
justice. The peacemaking system works through first both parties of the dispute agreeing to 
use a peacemaker instead of the tribal court system. Then a tribal judge appoints a peace 
maker, who can be any member of the tribe over 35 years old with a reputation of honesty 
and integrity among the community. The peacemaker will then have the power to: 1) mediate 
disputes, 2) use tribal religious or other traditional ways of mediation, 3) instruct or counsel 
individuals on traditional tribal teachings or values relating to the dispute, 4) encourage 
participation of people affected by the dispute, and 5) use any means consistent with the 
principles in order to resolve the dispute. The peacemaker does not have the authority to 
decide a disputed matter unless both parties agree to such authority. 
 
The modern tribal court system originated with the BIA, which had BIA local agents or favored Indians 
provide law and order. In 1883 the Secretary of the Interior established the Courts of Indian Offenses, 
which provided local BIA agents “with guidelines for court organization and a limited criminal and 
civil code.
59” The centrally controlled courts not only did not reflect the norms and traditions of the 
local Native American populations, but actively sought to undermine and eradicate them. When the 
BIA commissioner proposed the court system to the Secretary of the Interior in 1882, he wrote that its  
purpose was to repress religious practices deemed as “heathenish rites” and to “destroy the tribal 
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relations as fast as possible.”60Following the passage of the IRA, tribal governments began to 
establish their own tribal courts or take over the local Courts of Indian Offenses. Modern tribal 
courts “mirror American courts” with law trained judges that handle “criminal, civil, traffic, 
domestic relations, and juvenile matters and are guided by written codes, rules, procedures, 
and guidelines.”61 Yet some tribes incorporate indigenous justice methods as an alternative 
resolutions process “for matters that are highly interpersonal, either as a diversion alternative, 
as part of sentencing, or for victim-offender mediation.”62 Therefore this study utilizes a 2002 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Survey on tribal justice systems to answer the following question: 
does the tribe only use modern tribal courts or does it incorporate traditional justice methods as 
an alternative resolution process? Traditional justice methods include traditional forums, and 
peacemaking courts
63
. 
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Results and Analysis 
 
This chapter will first present the results of a series of statistical tests designed to show 
 
statistically significant differences in state controlled overall tribal development scores between 
 
competing institutional designs (Independent Sample T-Tests), and to show relationships 
between institutional design quantitative proxies and state controlled overall tribal development 
scores (Linear Regression Tests). It will present such findings in the same sections and order as 
the independent variables were presented in the previous chapter. After presenting and analyzing 
the findings for each section, the chapter will conclude with a holistic statistical test of the 
findings all taken together. 
 
Legitimacy 
 
The distribution of constitutional designs shows that Hybrid constitutions outperform both IRA 
 
and traditional constitutions. One can see from figure 7 that IRA constitutions have a lower 
 
distribution (#1) and mean (.646) 
Figure 7 Box and Whisker Plot Constitution Types 
than traditional constitutions (#2) 
 
(.745) and hybrid constitutions (#3) 
 
(.756) respectively. Traditional 
constitutions have a similar mean to 
hybrid constitutions, but an 
independent T-Test that compares the 
means of hybrid constitutions with 
the combined means of IRA and 
traditional constitutions shows hybrid 
constitutions have a statistically 
significant higher mean than both: 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 
 
Hybrid Constitutions 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
Std. Error Mean 
  
State Controlled Overall Score 
 
Yes 
 
29 
 
.75603 
 
.190103 
 
.035301 
 
No 
 
41 
 
.66822 
 
.179478 
 
.028030 
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t-test for Equality of Means 
 
t df Sig. (2- 
 
tailed) 
Mean 
 
Difference 
Std. Error 
 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
 
of the Difference 
 
 
 
State 
 
Controlled 
 
Overall 
 
Score 
 
 
Equal variances assumed 
 
 
Equal variances not assumed 
 
 
1.968 68 
 
1.948 58.233 
 
 
.053 .087815 
 
.056 .087815 
 
 
.044628 
 
.045076 
Lower 
 
-.001238 
 
-.002407 
Upper 
 
.176868 
 
.178037 
 
 
 
If the test were done in reverse, where the mean of traditional constitutions are 
 
compared with the combined means of hybrid and IRA constitutions the statistically significant 
finding does not hold: 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 
 
Traditional Constitutions 
 
 
N 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
 
Std. Error Mean 
  
State Controlled Overall 
 
Score 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
9 
 
 
.74567 
 
 
.154052 
 
 
.051351 
  
No 
 
 
61 
 
 
.69854 
 
 
.192532 
 
 
.024651 
  
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
t df Sig. (2- 
 
tailed) 
Mean 
 
Difference 
Std. Error 
 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
 
of the Difference 
 
 
 
 
State Controlled 
 
Overall Score 
 
 
Equal variances 
 
assumed 
 
Equal variances not 
 
assumed 
 
 
.700 68 
 
 
.827 12.027 
 
 
.486 .047126 
 
 
.424 .047126 
 
 
.067278 
 
 
.056961 
Lower 
 
-.087126 
 
 
-.076951 
Upper 
 
.181377 
 
 
.171202 
 
 
Therefore it is at least safe to conclude that hybrid constitutions outperform IRA constitutions, 
while it is inconclusive whether or not hybrid constitutions outperform traditional constitutions. 
This result supports the theory that imposed institutions that do not reflect underlying tradition 
lack legitimacy, and therefore result in lower tribal development. 
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Property Rights 
 
Centralization 
 
The first test for this section seeks to identify a relationship between the proxy for 
 
centralized control or influence within a tribal economy, 
 
percentage of public workers in the tribal economy, 
and the state controlled overall tribal development 
score of the tribe. The linear regression test shows a 
statistically significant moderate negative 
relationship between the percentage of public 
workers in a tribe’s economy and its state controlled 
overall tribal development score: 
 
 
Figure 8 Relationship between 
%'Public Workers and Development 
 
 
Model Summary 
 
Model 
 
 
R 
 
 
R Square 
 
 
Adjusted R 
 
Square 
 
 
Std. Error of the 
 
Estimate 
  
1 
 
.415
a 
 
 
.172 
 
 
.160 
 
 
.172074 
  
a. Predictors: (Constant), % of Public Workers 
 
 
Coefficients
a 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients 
 
 
Standardized t Sig. 
 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
(Constant) 
1 
Public Workers 
B Std. Error 
 
.878 .051 
 
-.507 .135 
Beta 
 
17.358 .000 
 
-.415 -3.757 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: State Controlled Overall Score 
 
 
 
This result supports the theory that centralized paternalistic economic control does not only not 
result in tribal development, but actually is a hindrance to development. This finding could be 
interpreted in reverse as well, for it could be argued that lack of development draws in federal 
transfer funds and BIA economic development schemes. Yet the fact that the federal government 
has been investing in these schemes since the 1960s without major self-sustaining effect shows 
that the tribes who break federal dependence perform better.
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CPR Institutions 
 
In order to identify the presence of Tribal Business Enterprises in a tribe’s economy the 
 
study uses two proxy numbers: percentage of private workers and the number of casino’s the 
 
tribe operates. A linear regression test that uses both 
 
proxies as independent variables, and the state 
controlled overall tribal development score as the 
dependent variable results in a statistically 
significant moderately positive relationship: 
 
Figure 9 'Relationship between % 
Private Workers and Development 
 
 
 
Model Summary 
 
Model 
 
 
R 
 
 
R Square 
 
 
Adjusted R 
 
Square 
 
 
Std. Error of the 
 
Estimate 
  
1 
 
.481
a 
 
 
.231 
 
 
.208 
 
 
.167056 
  
a. Predictors: (Constant), Casinos, Private Workers 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficients
a 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients 
 
 
Standardized t Sig. 
 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
(Constant) 
 
1 Private Workers 
 
Casinos 
B Std. Error 
 
.399 .083 
 
.430 .134 
 
.028 .011 
Beta 
 
4.794 .000 
 
.347 3.196 .002 
 
.281 2.586 .012 
 
a. Dependent Variable: State Controlled Overall Score 
 
 
This result supports the theory that common pool resource institutions are the best performing 
property right regimes for producing overall tribal development. The casino result especially 
shows that CPR institutions are effective at converting a common pool resource into general 
welfare, rather than just benefitting elites, which is critical for many developing countries rich in 
natural resources, but mired in the resource curse. A case study of how the Seminole Tribe of
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Florida converts their casino success into the general welfare of the tribe illustrates the 
institutional mechanisms that explain this result
64
: 
 
Case Study 4: CPR Collective Benefits- The Seminole Tribe of Florida 
 
 
The Seminole tribe has found tremendous economic success in tribal business enterprise 
in the entertainment, tourist, and agricultural industry. How does their politics translate 
that economic success into general welfare? Distribution of tribal enterprise profits are 
done in three ways: per capita payments, public good provision, and diversification. Per 
capita payments are distributed to each member of the tribe to insure a basic standard of 
living out of poverty for each tribal member. This type of distribution reflects past 
Seminole traditions of evenly splitting game caught by hunters among all families, rather 
than the hunter owning the prize solely. Next the tribe provides public goods to its 
members in the form of universal healthcare, educational scholarships, cultural events, 
and infrastructure. Finally the tribe provides diversification by investing in new lines of 
revenue besides casinos in order to employ tribal members, insure future revenue flow, 
and reduce risk of reliance on one industry. This ability to translate tribal wealth into 
collective well-being is derived from Seminole culture and politics. In Seminole culture 
people “despise the man who lives rich,” but rather measures how rich you are “by how 
much you share.” Thus politicians seek to get elected by promising more sharing of the 
wealth. Tribal officials are cultural expected to share not only the tribe’s wealth, but 
their individual wealth as well. For example at community meetings tribal officials 
always distribute prizes, and are expected to pick up the tab of a tribal member if they 
happen to be in the same restaurant. This culture translated into politics when the tribe 
impeached longtime tribal chairman James Billie (elected in 1979) in 2001 for “lining his 
own pockets and letting power get to his head.” A tribal culture of sharing in conjunction 
with accountable government translates economic success into collective development and 
increased welfare. 
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 Accountability 
 
Legislative Elections 
 
In order to compare the performances of the 43 tribal governments who elect their tribal 
 
council members via staggered elections by the entire tribe with the 22 tribal governments who 
 
elect their tribal council members via biannual elections by district, the study will compare the 
means of each group using an independent samples t-test
65
. The results of the test on all tribes in 
the sample show a higher mean for the former method, but not at a statistically significant level: 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 
 
District or Tribe 
 
 
N 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
 
Std. Error Mean 
  
State Controlled Overall Score 
 
 
District 
 
 
22 
 
 
.66859 
 
 
.200374 
 
 
.042720 
  
Tribe 
 
 
43 
 
 
.71686 
 
 
.171704 
 
 
.026185 
  
 
 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
t df Sig. (2- 
 
tailed) 
Mean 
 
Difference 
Std. Error 
 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
 
of the Difference 
 
 
 
 
State Controlled 
 
Overall Score 
 
 
Equal variances 
 
assumed 
 
Equal variances not 
 
assumed 
 
 
-1.013 63 
 
 
-.963     37.123 
 
 
.315 -.048270 
 
 
.342 -.048270 
 
 
.047645 
 
 
.050106 
Lower 
 
-.143481 
 
 
-.149783 
Upper 
 
.046942 
 
 
.053244 
 
 
Yet if one were to use the same test on tribes above the median population, than the result is 
statistically significant: 
 
Group Statistics 
 
 
District or Tribe 
 
 
N 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
 
Std. Error Mean 
  
State Controlled Overall Score 
 
 
District 
 
 
18 
 
 
.65917 
 
 
.184015 
 
 
.043373 
  
Tribe 
 
 
16 
 
 
.76563 
 
 
.135213 
 
 
.033803 
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5 Traditional governments were excluded from test due to non-applicable election procedures
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t-test for Equality of Means 
  
t 
 
 
df 
 
 
Sig. (2- 
 
tailed) 
 
 
Mean 
 
Difference 
 
 
Std. Error 
 
Difference 
 
 
95% Confidence Interval of 
 
the Difference 
  
Lower 
 
 
Upper 
  
State 
 
Controlled 
 
Overall 
 
Score 
 
 
Equal variances 
 
assumed 
 
 
 
-1.901 
 
 
32 
 
 
.066 
 
 
-.106458 
 
 
.055995 
 
 
-.220516 
 
 
.007599 
 
 
Equal variances not 
 
assumed 
 
 
-1.936 
 
 
30.973 
 
 
.062 
 
 
-.106458 
 
 
.054990 
 
 
-.218614 
 
 
.005698 
 
 
 
This result matches the logic expressed in the corresponding section on accountability in 
legislative elections in the chapter 2 on independent variables. The theory hypothesizes that the 
election system needs the greatest possible number of tribal members in the winning coalition to 
gain or retain office in order for the legislator to have the incentive to consider the collective will 
over their family’s will or district’s will. The abstract example shows that with a 1,000 member 
tribe with tribal council of 6 members the former method needs almost 100 more tribal members 
in the winning coalition than the latter. If one were to reference the population distribution of 
tribes in the sample at the end of chapter 1, one would see that the population size increases 
exponentially after the median tribe from 2,668 members to 43,193 members. So if the tribe’s 
population is 44,000 instead of 1,000 members, that means the former method needs almost 
4,000 more tribal members in the winning coalition than the latter. Thus the former method’s 
advantage increases exponentially with the increase in population size of the tribe, assuming that 
the number of council members increase exponentially as well
66
. 
 
Executive Elections 
 
In order to compare the performances of the 42 tribal governments who elect their tribal 
 
executive via popular tribal elections with the 22 tribal governments who elect their tribal 
executive via majority tribal council vote, the study will compare the means of each group using 
an independent samples t-test. The results of the test on all tribes in the sample show a higher 
mean for the former method at a nearly statistically significant level: 
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A linear regression shows a strong (r=.511) positive linear relationship between tribe population and council 
members, but not a cubic relationship.
 
 
Executive Election 
 
 
N 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
 
Std. Error Mean 
  
State Controlled Overall Score 
 
 
Council 
 
 
28 
 
 
.66404 
 
 
.167352 
 
 
.031627 
  
Tribe 
 
42 
 
.73164 
 
.197448 
 
 
.030467 
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Group Statistics 
 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
t df Sig. (2- 
 
tailed) 
Mean 
 
Difference 
Std. Error 
 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
 
of the Difference 
 
 
 
 
State Controlled 
 
Overall Score 
 
 
Equal variances 
 
assumed 
 
Equal variances not 
 
assumed 
 
 
-1.489 68 
 
 
-1.540     64.044 
 
 
.141 -.067607 
 
 
.129 -.067607 
 
 
.045399 
 
 
.043914 
Lower 
 
-.158200 
 
 
-.155335 
Upper 
 
.022986 
 
 
.020121
 
Yet if one were to use the same test on tribes below the median population, than the result is 
statistically significant: 
Group Statistics 
 
 
Executive Election 
 
 
N 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
 
Std. Error Mean 
  
State Controlled Overall Score 
 
 
Council 
 
 
17 
 
 
.6351 
 
 
.19174 
 
 
.04650 
  
Tribe 
 
 
18 
 
 
.7614 
 
 
.21090 
 
 
.04971 
  
 
  
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
  
t 
 
 
df 
 
 
Sig. (2- 
 
tailed) 
 
 
Mean 
 
Difference 
 
 
Std. Error 
 
Difference 
 
 
95% Confidence Interval 
 
of the Difference 
  
Lower 
 
 
Upper 
  
 
State Controlled 
 
Overall Score 
 
 
Equal variances 
 
assumed 
 
 
-1.851 
 
 
33 
 
 
.073 
 
 
-.12639 
 
 
.06826 
 
 
-.26527 
 
 
.01249 
 
 
Equal variances not 
 
assumed 
 
 
-1.857 
 
 
32.957 
 
 
.072 
 
 
-.12639 
 
 
.06807 
 
 
-.26488 
 
 
.01211 
 
 
 
This result also matches the logic expressed in the corresponding section on accountability in 
legislative elections in the chapter 2 on independent variables, but in the reverse of the above 
section. In this case the winning coalition according to the assumptions of the abstract example in 
chapter 2 will always be 25% of the population. Therefore as the population  increases 
exponentially, the winning coalition experiences increasing decreasing marginal returns on each 
added member of the winning coalition. For example the increase of the winning coalition in 
a1,000 member tribe from 250 to 251 has a large effect than the increase in the winning coalition 
in a 10,000 member tribe from 2,500 to 2,501. Therefore one would expect a larger institutional 
effect of this institutional design in tribes below the median population size
50 
 
Rule of Law 
 
Police Provision 
 
In order to compare the performances of the 30 tribes who primarily use tribal police with 
 
the 35 tribes who primarily use outside sources of police, the study will compare the means of 
each group using an independent samples t-test
67
. The results of the test show a higher mean for 
the former method at a statistically significant level: 
 
Group Statistics 
 
 
Police 
 
 
N 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
 
Std. Error Mean 
  
State Controlled Overall Score 
 
 
Tribal 
 
 
30 
 
 
.74537 
 
 
.202295 
 
 
.036934 
  
Outside 
 
 
35 
 
 
.66089 
 
 
.177093 
 
 
.029934 
  
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
t df Sig. (2- 
 
tailed) 
Mean 
 
Difference 
Std. Error 
 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
 
of the Difference 
 
 
 
 
State Controlled 
 
Overall Score 
 
 
Equal variances 
 
assumed 
 
Equal variances not 
 
assumed 
 
 
1.795 63 
 
 
1.777     58.195 
 
 
.077 .084481 
 
 
.081 .084481 
 
 
.047052 
 
 
.047541 
Lower 
 
-.009545 
 
 
-.010676 
Upper 
 
.178507 
 
 
.179638 
 
This result supports the theory that tribes who 
primarily use their own tribal police, 
rather than outside sources will more 
effectively serve the community and 
assist in tribal development. This 
finding could be challenged with the 
reverse argument that only rich tribes 
can provide tribal police, therefore the 
question is biased. Yet if one were to 
look at the distribution of each 
category (Figure 10) one would see 
that the poorest  
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5 Tribes (Crow Tribe of Montana, Haliwa–Saponi Tribe, Onieda Nation of New York, Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe 
 
of the Pyramid Lake Reservation, and the Seneca Nation of New York) did not answer the tribal police survey 
questions in the data set 
Figure 3 Police Provision Box and Whisker Graph 
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tribe in primarily tribal police distribution is within the bottom quartile of the primarily 
outside source distribution. Thus over 75% of the outside source tribes can afford primary 
tribe police provision. 
 
Court Systems 
 
In order to compare the performances of the 19 tribes who use traditional courts 
 
solely or in conjunction with tribal courts, with the 42 tribes that solely use modern tribal courts, 
the study will compare the means of each group using an independent samples t-test
68
. The 
results of the test show a higher mean for the former method at statistically significant level: 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 
 
Types of Courts 
 
 
N 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
 
Std. Error Mean 
  
State Controlled Overall Score 
 
 
Traditional 
 
 
19 
 
 
.76058 
 
 
.136053 
 
 
.031213 
  
Tribal Court 
 
 
42 
 
 
.68088 
 
 
.200083 
 
 
.030874 
  
 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
t df Sig. (2- 
 
tailed) 
Mean 
 
Difference 
Std. Error 
 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
 
of the Difference 
 
 
 
 
State Controlled 
 
Overall Score 
 
 
Equal variances 
 
assumed 
 
Equal variances not 
 
assumed 
 
 
1.576 59 
 
 
1.815     49.606 
 
 
.120 .079698 
 
 
.076 .079698 
 
 
.050579 
 
 
.043902 
Lower 
 
-.021511 
 
 
-.008500 
Upper 
 
.180907 
 
 
.167896 
 
 
 
 
 This result supports the theory that institutions that utilize restorative and reparative 
 justice perform better in tribal collectivist societies than institutions based on retributive 
 systems. 
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7 tribes did not respond to the Justice System and upon further research did not have a tribal court system
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Holistic Study 
 
The final statistical test seeks to test whether or not the presence of collectivist 
 
institutions identified by the study predicts tribal economic development. The independent 
variable for this test is an index of institutional designs. Collectivist institutional designs receive 
a score of 2; individualistic institutional designs receive a score of 1; and unknown institutional 
designs due to coding non applicability or missing data receive a score of 1.5. Collectivist 
institutional designs are hybrid traditional and legal constitutions (legitimacy), common pool 
resource institutions (property rights), legislative elections by the entire tribe (accountability), 
executive elections by popular vote (accountability), tribal police provision (rule of law), and 
traditional court systems (rule of law)
69
. Individualistic institutional designs are IRA imposed 
constitutions (legitimacy), private or centralized property rights (property rights), legislative 
elections by district (accountability), executive elections by tribal council (accountability), 
outside police provision (rule of law), and formal tribal court structures (rule of law) 
respectively. The institutional design scores are then added up into a total index score. A linear 
regression test with the institutional design index as the independent variable, the state controlled 
overall tribal development score as the dependent variable, and the tribe’s factor of production 
endowments as control variables shows a statistically significant strong relationship between 
collectivist institutional designs and tribal development: 
 
 
Model Summary 
 
Model 
 
 
R 
 
 
R Square 
 
 
Adjusted R 
 
Square 
 
 
Std. Error of the 
 
Estimate 
  
1 
 
.531
a 
 
 
.282 
 
 
.238 
 
 
.163878 
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CPR institutions are determined by having a private worker percentage over the median .607, while centralized 
institutions have a priva te worker percentage lower than the median
 
Model 
 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
 
 
Standardized 
 
Coefficients 
 
 
t 
 
 
Sig. 
 
 
B 
 
 
Std. Error 
 
 
Beta 
  
 
 
 
1 
 
 
(Constant) 
 
 
.058 
 
 
.147 
 
 
 
.395 
 
 
.694 
  
Institutional Design Index Score 
 
 
.073 
 
 
.016 
 
 
.503 
 
 
4.545 
 
 
.000 
  
Land 
 
 
7.535E-006 
 
 
.000 
 
 
.050 
 
 
.460 
 
 
.647 
  
Labor 
 
 
1.129E-006 
 
 
.000 
 
 
.085 
 
 
.596 
 
 
.553 
  
Capital 
 
 
-1.730E-010 
 
 
.000 
 
 
-.189 
 
 
-1.409 
 
 
.164 
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Figure 11 Graphical Relationship between Tribal Development and Institutional Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This linear regression test shows that the number one predictor of tribal economic development 
is institutional design. It also shows that as the number of collectivist institutional designs 
increase for a tribe, so does tribal development. This holistic test in combination with the other 
tests in this chapter make a strong case for collectivist institutions for tribally organized societies, 
rather than individualistic institutions.
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Conclusion 
 
The findings of this paper can be summed up in two words: self-determination. History is 
 
replete with examples of settled agrarian societies trying to ‘pacify’ the tribal people of distant 
and harsh lands. The ancient Mesopotamians and Egyptians had to battle the Hittites of 
mountainous Anatolia; the ancient Chinese fought the Xiongnu of the steppes, the Romans 
clashed with the Germanic tribes of the dense forests, the Byzantines succumbed to the 
marauding Arabs of the desert. This trend extended into the colonial area when the great of the 
West competed to divide up the globe. The Spanish devastated the indigenous populations 
inhabiting the jungles of South America; the Dutch dominated the islanders of the Southeast 
Asian archipelagos; British took the African Savanah from the nomadic tribesmen, the Russians 
conquered the steppe tribes of Central-Asia; the French pacified the jungles of Southeast Asia; 
the Americans pushed the Native Americans off the Great Plains. Today the United States is 
fighting a war on terror. A war whose frontlines are in the remote tribal areas in the world: 
Afghanistan, the FATA areas of Pakistan, Western Iraq, Eastern Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and 
Mali. Instead of repeating the same mistakes of the Indian Wars, which focused on destroying 
the Native American’s traditional way of life, the United States needs to embrace this way of 
life. It needs to give the tribes the legal power to realize their own self-determination. The tribes 
of the world need collectivist institutions that match the underlying traditions, values, and beliefs 
of tribal societies. They do not need Western institutions imposed on them, but rather they need 
the Constitutional Tribe. 
 
What is the Constitutional Tribe? The findings of this paper point to a set of underlying 
principles necessary for successful tribal self-government: 
 
1. Constitutional Tribal Sovereignty: the tribe must be a legal entity based on its 
traditional membership and core traditional values. The rules and laws governing the 
actions of the tribal government should be a hybrid between traditional and legal 
authority. The tribe should be sovereign in that it is embedded within a larger settled 
society with special prerogatives in collective property rights, self-government, and the 
administration of law and justice.
55 
 
2. Common Pool Resource Institutions: tribal economic activity should be primarily 
conducted on a collective basis through Tribal Business Enterprises. These institutions 
combine on the ancient trust, traditional comparative advantages, and collective mindset 
of the tribe with the legal strengths of private firms in terms of flexible organization, 
market accountability, and innovation to create hybrid organizations that employ tribal 
members and contribute to the collective well-being. 
3. Collectively Accountable Institutions: tribal self-government must be based on the 
consensus collective will of the people in order to remain legitimate and be effective. 
Institutions that promote holistic and consensus incentives for leaders will best reflect the 
collective will of the people. 
4. Communal Justice: those who enforce and interpret the collective will of the people 
must not only be members of the tribal community, but be deeply ingrained in its 
traditions and values. Trust is the basis of tribal justice, therefore the police must be held 
accountable to the tribe, while the courts must focus their rulings on rebuilding trust and 
repairing relationships. 
 
Looking Forward 
 
Defeating poverty, ethno-sectarian violence, failed states, and international terrorism is 
 
the global challenge of our time. The sources of these international problems are inextricably 
linked to the nexus of geography and political institutions. The greatest weapon the international 
community has is the local people who suffer the most from this state of affairs. Tribes need the 
tools to realize their collective goals. Such tools include extensive legal help in establishing 
formal institutions and codifying traditional practices. They need help establishing formal 
business enterprise structures and the financial acumen to distribute their benefits. Therefore 
there is a strong need for an NGO composed of international lawyers, anthropologists, and 
business people who can provide this assistance to tribes on a worldwide scale. Let us give them 
the tools to shape and wield this weapon to combat poverty, violence and corruption. Let us give 
them their traditions back. Let us give them their property back. Let us give them their voice 
back. Let us give them their laws back. Let us give them the Constitutional Tribe.
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Appendix A: Tribe General Information 
 
Tribe Name 
 
State 
 
Estimated 
 
Population 
 
State 
 
Controlled 
 
Overall Score 
 
Institutional 
 
Design 
 
Index Score 
 
Alabama-Coushatta Tribes 
 
Texas 
 
1020 
 
0.566 
 
8.0 
 
Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa 
 
Indians 
 
Wisconsin 
 
4191 
 
0.768 
 
8.0 
 
Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation of 
 
Montana 
 
Montana 
 
27,279 
 
0.587 
 
6.0 
 
Catawba Indian Nation (Catawba Tribe of South 
 
Carolina) 
 
South 
 
Carolina 
 
2,025 
 
0.839 
 
9.5 
 
Cherokee Nation 
 
Oklahoma 
 
24,380 
 
0.993 
 
10.0 
 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of the Cheyenne River 
 
Reservation 
 
South Dakota 
 
8,936 
 
0.387 
 
8.0 
 
Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana 
 
Louisiana 
 
1,552 
 
0.993 
 
10.0 
 
Cocopah Tribe of Arizona 
 
Arizona 
 
1295 
 
0.545 
 
10.5 
 
Coeur D’Alene Tribe of the Coeur D'Alene Reservation 
 
Idaho 
 
2101 
 
0.827 
 
9.0 
 
Comanche Nation 
 
Oklahoma 
 
23,330 
 
0.834 
 
10.0 
 
Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation 
 
Washington 
 
853 
 
0.317 
 
9.0 
 
Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of 
 
Oregon 
 
Oregon 
 
4,287 
 
0.851 
 
8.0 
 
Confederated Tribes of the Siletz Reservation 
 
Oregon 
 
3,912 
 
0.513 
 
9.0 
 
Crow Tribe of Montana 
 
Montana 
 
15,203 
 
0.586 
 
9.0 
 
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians of North Carolina 
 
North 
 
Carolina 
 
11,835 
 
0.739 
 
9.0 
 
Fort Mojave Indian Tribe (Arizona, California and 
 
Nevada) 
 
California, 
 
Arizona, 
 
Nevada 
 
1,872 
 
0.681 
 
9.0 
 
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 
 
Michigan 
 
2,668 
 
0.774 
 
12.0 
 
Haliwa-Saponi Tribe 
 
North 
 
Carolina 
 
3,795 
 
0.807 
 
11.0 
 
Havasupai Tribe of the Havasupai Reservation 
 
Arizona 
 
662 
 
0.624 
 
7.0 
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Hoopa Valley Tribe 
 
California 
 
3523 
 
0.731 
 
9.0 
 
Hualapai Indian Tribe of the Hualapai Indian Tribe 
 
Reservation 
 
Arizona 
 
1300 
 
0.698 
 
9.0 
 
Karuk Tribe of California 
 
California 
 
6115 
 
0.801 
 
11.0 
 
Kaw Nation 
 
Oklahoma 
 
2,389 
 
1.056 
 
11.0 
 
Lower Brule Sioux Tribe of the Lower Brule Reservation 
 
South Dakota 
 
2,274 
 
0.376 
 
7.0 
 
Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation 
 
Washington 
 
4427 
 
0.727 
 
10.0 
 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe (Six component reservations: 
 
Bois Forte Band (Nett Lake); 
 
Minnesota 
 
2,998 
 
0.555 
 
6.0 
 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 
 
Mississippi 
 
8,979 
 
0.875 
 
9.0 
 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation 
 
Oklahoma 
 
43,193 
 
0.891 
 
9.0 
 
Oneida Nation of New York 
 
New York 
 
11,555 
 
0.844 
 
8.5 
 
Pala Band of Luiseño Mission Indians of the Pala 
 
Reservation 
 
California 
 
1310 
 
1.135 
 
11.0 
 
Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona 
 
Arizona 
 
8053 
 
0.763 
 
10.0 
 
Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma 
 
Oklahoma 
 
4,878 
 
0.972 
 
10.0 
 
Penobscot Tribe of Maine 
 
Maine 
 
4,278 
 
0.849 
 
10.0 
 
Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians of California 
 
California 
 
1965 
 
0.564 
 
9.0 
 
Pit River Tribe (includes XL Ranch, Big Bend, Likely, 
 
Lookout, Montgomery Creek and Roaring Creek 
 
Rancherias) 
 
California 
 
2939 
 
0.629 
 
10.0 
 
Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians (Michigan and 
 
Indiana) 
 
Michigan 
 
1,793 
 
0.624 
 
11.0 
 
Pueblo of Laguna 
 
New Mexico 
 
6758 
 
0.777 
 
9.0 
 
Pueblo of San Felipe 
 
New Mexico 
 
2375 
 
0.813 
 
8.0 
 
Pueblo of Santa Clara 
 
New Mexico 
 
1,182 
 
0.948 
 
10.0 
 
Pueblo of Santo Domingo 
 
New Mexico 
 
3519 
 
0.705 
 
10.0 
 
Pueblo of Taos 
 
New Mexico 
 
1,986 
 
0.546 
 
8.5 
 
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of the Pyramid Lake 
 
Reservation (Nevada) 
 
Nevada 
 
933 
 
0.778 
 
7.0 
 
Quapaw Tribe of Indians 
 
Oklahoma 
 
3,327 
 
0.778 
 
9.0 
 
Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation 
 
(Arizona and California) 
 
California 
 
2733 
 
0.657 
 
8.0 
 
Quileute Tribe of the Quileute Reservation 
 
Washington 
 
598 
 
0.346 
 
7.0 
 
Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians 
 
Minnesota 
 
7,459 
 
0.553 
 
9.0 
 
Sac and Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa 
 
Iowa 
 
1,596 
 
0.595 
 
8.0 
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!  
San Carlos Apache Tribe of the San Carlos Reservation 
 
Arizona 
 
10900 
 
0.523 
 
8.5 
 
Seminole Tribe of Florida (Dania, Big Cypress, Brighton, 
 
Hollywood and Tampa Reservations) 
 
Florida 
 
1,005 
 
1.054 
 
9.5 
 
Seneca Nation of New York 
 
New York 
 
1429 
 
0.815 
 
9.5 
 
Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma 
 
Oklahoma 
 
2124 
 
0.896 
 
11.0 
 
Skokomish Indian Tribe of the Skokomish Reservation 
 
Washington 
 
877 
 
0.576 
 
9.0 
 
Southern Ute Indian Tribe of the Southern Ute 
 
Reservation 
 
Colorado 
 
1,572 
 
0.728 
 
10.0 
 
Stockbridge Munsee Community 
 
Wisconsin 
 
4114 
 
0.733 
 
10.0 
 
Te-Moak Tribes of Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada 
 
Nevada 
 
1,499 
 
0.587 
 
8.0 
 
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation 
 
North Dakota 
 
3,379 
 
0.754 
 
7.0 
 
Tohono O’odham Nation of Arizona 
 
Arizona 
 
19453 
 
0.534 
 
8.5 
 
Tule River Indian Tribe of the Tule River Reservation 
 
California 
 
1393 
 
0.490 
 
8.5 
 
Tuscarora Nation of New York 
 
New York 
 
2364 
 
0.768 
 
7.5 
 
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
 
Utah 
 
1630 
 
0.367 
 
7.0 
 
Ute Mountain Tribe of the Ute Mountain Reservation 
 
(Colorado, New Mexico and Utah) 
 
New Mexico, 
 
Colorado, 
 
New Mexico 
 
1359 
 
0.545 
 
8.0 
 
Washoe Tribe (Carson Colony, Dresslerville Colony, 
 
Woodfords Community, Stewart Community and Washoe 
 
Ranches) 
 
California, 
 
Nevada 
 
2058 
 
0.827 
 
7.0 
 
White Mountain Apache Tribe of the Fort Apache 
 
Reservation 
 
Arizona 
 
14177 
 
0.268 
 
7.0 
 
Wichita and Affiliated Tribes (Wichita, Keechi, Waco and 
 
Tawakonie) 
 
Oklahoma 
 
1,637 
 
0.949 
 
10.0 
 
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska 
 
Nebraska 
 
429 
 
0.678 
 
8.0 
 
Wyandotte Nation 
 
Oklahoma 
 
4,366 
 
0.962 
 
10.0 
 
Yavapai Apache Nation of the Camp Verde Indian 
 
Reservation 
 
Arizona 
 
1615 
 
0.595 
 
8.0 
 
Yavapai-Prescott Tribe of the Yavapai Reservation 
 
Arizona 
 
544 
 
0.756 
 
9.0 
 
Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo of Texas 
 
Texas 
 
2,908 
 
0.461 
 
10.0 
 
Yurok Tribe of the Yurok Reservation 
 
California 
 
6567 
 
0.639 
 
8.5 
 
 
